

5 September 1952

(b)(3)

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Becker, Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Briefing of General Eisenhower - 30 August 1952

1. We* departed from National Airport by commercial plane at 2210 hours Friday evening, 29 August. We arrived at LaGuardia Field, New York, at 2315 where we were met by [redacted] from the New York O/O Contact Office. [redacted] had provided transportation for us to the Contact Office at 205 East 42nd Street. On arrival there, we locked up the classified material in the CIA vault. [redacted] called [redacted] also of the Contact Office, and arranged for him to meet us at 0700 the following morning. We also arranged for a car to meet us at the Contact Office at 0700 the next morning to transport us to 60 Morningside Drive, General Eisenhower's residence. The car was arranged for on a CIA contract with a local transportation firm which provides a Cadillac with chauffeur. On our way from the contact office, we walked to the airlines ticket office on 42nd Street and arranged for return reservations the following day. (It is well to keep in mind that there is more than one airfield in New York. We requested reservations on a flight leaving LaGuardia and, unfortunately, on arrival there the following noon, learned that the reservations had been made on a flight departing from Idlewild.)

2. We next went to the University Club, arriving about 0115 a.m. and thanks to [redacted] advanced arrangements, we got comfortable accommodations. We left the Club the next morning at 0620 by taxi to return to the Contact Office, about a ten-minute trip. On arrival there, we stopped at an Automat directly across the street for a quick breakfast. After eating we met [redacted] at the Contact Office and picked up the classified material from the vault. The car was waiting downstairs and we left for 60 Morningside Drive.

3. Probably because of the Labor Day weekend, traffic was light, and it took only about 20 minutes to drive that distance. After an unhurried trip through Central Park, we arrived at General Eisenhower's residence at 0730 and were admitted by one of his servants. Mr. Ed Green, on General Eisenhower's staff, met us and informed us that the General was not yet available but he hoped to get us on the appointment calendar for 0745. We waited in the library at the General's residence and promptly at 0745, the General arrived and we were introduced to him as "the gentlemen from CIA." General Eisenhower then suggested going to an adjoining room to look at the material.

* I was accompanied by [redacted]

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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4. I opened the material in the General's presence, called his attention to the situation map and asked him if he were interested in reviewing the military disposition of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces as portrayed on the map. His one question was, "Has there been any significant change in the past couple of months?" Since my reply was, "No," that disposed of the need for a map and probably eliminated any necessity for bringing a similar map to any future briefing. The General then sat down and carefully read the briefing material. I pointed out specifically the review of the Iranian situation which had been prepared subsequent to the initial compilation of the briefing material. He completed reading the briefing in about 20 minutes during which time he made two comments, the first being on the trade situation between Japan and China. His comment was, "Since trade is one of our most powerful weapons, it seems to me that we should employ it to its maximum. Where are the Japanese going to get their materials if they can't get them from China?" The other situation which aroused comment was the French difficulties in North Africa. His comment on this situation being, "If the French don't do something fairly soon, they will have another Indochina on their hands." His general remarks at the conclusion of the briefing were, "This does not materially change the impression that I already had on most of these situations." I raised the question with the General about his desire for future similar briefings. He replied that he wanted future briefings but not necessarily on an urgent basis. I suggested that I arrange with Mr. Green for the time and the place for future briefings to which the General agreed. The General expressed his appreciation for the briefing and then withdrew to a breakfast conference.

5. In the subsequent discussions with Mr. Green, he pointed out that the General's schedule would take him out of New York until the 10th of September and that possibly the following weekend would be an appropriate time for another briefing. The specific arrangements for the next briefing will therefore have to be arranged by telephone with Mr. Green subsequent to the General's return to New York on 10 September. Because of General Eisenhower's full schedule, Mr. Green suggested that a briefing at approximately a two-week interval would be the most satisfactory, with the exception that if CIA deemed any development of sufficient significance to be called to General Eisenhower's attention, arrangements could then be made for an interim briefing.

6. We then returned to the Contact Office and again secured the classified material with [REDACTED]. We left the Contact Office and attended to personal affairs while waiting for plane departure time, and returned at 1130 at which time we again picked up the briefing material and were taken to LaGuardia Field by the same chauffeur that had taken us to the General's residence. Upon checking our reservations at the airlines desk, we discovered that our flight was erroneously scheduled out of Idlewild instead of LaGuardia. Fortunately, there were

SECURITY INFORMATION

25 minutes before scheduled departure time and it was possible to change our reservations for another flight leaving at approximately 1230 from LaGuardia Field.

7. We left New York at 1145 and arrived at National Airport at about 1315. I called the CIA Watch Officer and requested transportation back to "Que" Building where we arrived at approximately 1340. I secured the material and reported the details of my trip to [REDACTED]. Later in the afternoon, I reached [REDACTED] by phone and reported that the mission had been completed.

8. The mission from start to finish was as smoothly coordinated as any with which I have ever been associated. The representatives at the O/O Contact Office in New York met us upon arrival, arranged for transportation at the exact time when needed and there was no significant delay or unnecessary waiting during the entire trip. This to me was very unexpected and unusual considering that all the details had been arranged with only about three to four hours advance notice.

MELVIN I. HENDRICKSON
Acting Chief
Soviet Strategy Staff

MIH:BAE

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Soviet Strategy Staff
Office of Current Intelligence
29 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

(b)(3)

Subject: Second Briefing for General Eisenhower in the Series
of Intelligence Briefings for Presidential Candidates

On Thursday, 25 September 1952, at 1625 hours I boarded General Eisenhower's campaign train at Silver Spring, Maryland. The General was on his way to Baltimore, Maryland, on a speaking tour. The General completed his speech from the rear platform of the train and about five minutes after the train left the station, at exactly 1700 hours, Senator Carlson escorted me to the Observation Lounge where the General was seated alone.

I presented the Intelligence Briefing paper to the General which he read and aside from a few casual remarks and comments, he raised only one question of substance. The Intelligence Briefing noted that "the present discussions on MEDO, like the original plans for the Middle East Command, do not envisage Greek participation." The General inquired why Greek participation was not contemplated. Since I was not fully prepared to elaborate on the details, I requested that he permit me to get all the facts for the next briefing. He readily agreed commenting that "too often political and military leaders have gone into that area of Europe and met with representatives of some of those countries thereby offending other countries not included in the talks."

General Eisenhower spent about twenty-five minutes carefully reading the briefing and his final comments were, "This certainly presents a picture of a gradually deteriorating situation all over the world. Sometimes I wonder if it has gone beyond a point from which it can be retrieved." He then expressed his thanks for the briefing and at 1725 hours I left the Observation Lounge and returned to the train compartment of Mr. Tom Stephens who had arranged the appointment. I left the train at the station in Baltimore and returned to Washington by the next train.

There were no unusual occurrences during the trip. The only persons he contacted, other than the General, were Senator Carlson, from Kansas, Mr. Tom Stephens and Miss Alice Smith of the General's entourage. I was accompanied by [REDACTED]

MELVIN I. HENDRICKSON
Acting Chief
Soviet Strategy Staff

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CC - CIA/ISA-1

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Soviet Strategy Staff
Office of Current Intelligence
28 October 1952

(b)(3)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Briefing of General Eisenhower - 25 October 1952

1. We* departed from Washington National Airport Friday, 24 October and stayed over night in New York. We rode a local train to Harmon Station the following morning and awaited General Eisenhower's campaign train which arrived at approximately 1015 hours.

2. We boarded General Eisenhower's campaign train while it was in Harmon Station, New York and accompanied him to Grand Central Station, New York City. Mr. Thomas Stephens arranged for me to meet the General at 1015 hours and the briefing lasted until about 1035.

3. General Eisenhower commented that the briefings had been very helpful but that he missed the G-3 information, which he said was essential for a complete understanding of the situation.

After General Eisenhower read the briefing material he commented that if he "got the job" some other arrangement would have to be made for the briefings. He mentioned getting clearance for some of his staff so they could also benefit from them.

I informed him that this was the last scheduled briefing prior to the election unless there was some particular phase of the situation which he would like amplified. He replied that he did not think that would be necessary.

4. No questions raised by the General remained unanswered and the series of four briefings which began on 30 August was completed without any untoward incidents.

MELVIN I. HENDRICKSON

* I was accompanied by [REDACTED]

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CD40979

CIA/CIA/5201

NLE MR Case No. 96-80
Document No. 1



File
(5)

~~NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM OFFICES OF RFE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16 April 1953

Special Guidance No. 8
on
President Eisenhower's Speech
of April 16, 1953

1. Eisenhower has taken the offensive against the Kremlin. Seizing the advantage offered by the internal weakness of Stalin's successors, he has spoken over the heads of the men in the Kremlin to the peoples of the Soviet Union. He has told them that they can have peace. He has revealed the principles on which a just peace should be founded. He has laid down the humanitarian and political conditions which will make peace possible. He has not written a diplomatic note but has spoken as man to man with the peoples of the Soviet Union. Why build a heavy bomber, he asks, when for the same effort you can build 30 brick schools, or two fine hospitals, or two electric power plants that will serve two towns of 50,000 people? Why pay for a single fighter plane with half a million bushels of wheat? And Eisenhower comments, "This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron."
2. This is not the speech of a pacifist. Our listeners do not need to fear that it means peace at any price. Eisenhower faces the world -- both the enemy world and the free world -- with courage and realism. He says to the Russian peoples: Either peace with justice for all, or war. "Hot" war, if that is what the Kremlin chooses. For he says, the free world is determined, at any cost to remain "armed, strong, and ready for any risk of war." Cold war, if that is the Kremlin's choice; but let the Kremlin beware what that means: fear and tension until the Soviet system collapses; the kind of fear and tension that our peoples have known for years, but that the rulers of our peoples also have known; the kind of fear and tension the Soviet peoples have known for years, but also that Malenkov and Beria and Molotov now know more bitterly and uneasily than ever before.
3. Or the Kremlin can have peace -- with justice. What does "peace with justice" mean? It means, says Eisenhower, that every people has an inalienable right to choose its own form of government and its own institutions. It means that no people has any right whatever to dictate to other peoples what form of government they should erect. It means, says Eisenhower, that the nations of central and eastern Europe must be given back their independence; there must be an end, says Eisenhower, to the "unnatural partition of Europe." And he asks the men in the Kremlin directly: "Are you prepared to allow the peoples of central and eastern Europe free choice in the determination of their forms of government and freedom to associate with other nations in a worldwide community of law?"

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APR 1999



4. This challenge to Moscow is something new. It is the end of the American policy of "containment;" it is the beginning of the Eisenhower policy of liberation. Liberation, until April 16, was an idea, an aspiration; with Eisenhower's speech it becomes a major article of policy and a condition of any future peace.

5. And what does Eisenhower offer the Kremlin in exchange for peace, in exchange, that is, for the liberation of our own people? "We care nothing for rhetoric," he says. "We care only for sincerely powerful purpose." We are ready, he says, to work with others who are willing to use their energies, their resources, their imagination, to make war against "the brute forces of poverty and need." We will do this, he says; we will ask the American people to devote the money that would be saved by disarmament to a fund for world reconstruction. We do not want to see war monuments; we want to see the monuments of peace arise in every country on earth.

6. Eisenhower has settled forever the question: Will the Americans allow themselves to be deceived by the empty peace gestures of the Kremlin? The answer is no! It may be that Moscow will sell out the Prague, or other regimes, for a just peace with the U. S. A. It is absolutely certain that the U. S. A. will not sell out our listeners for an unjust peace with the Kremlin.

Pravda also published an article by Gorsenjin Headlined "Socialist Legislation on guard of People's Interests " written in connection with the "toctor's case."

2. Radio Moscow on Eisenhower's Speech

In this connection, Radio Moscow emphasized that the majority of it dealt with justification and motivation of U^S foreign policy, such as race to arm and the creation of NATO. Special importance is given to statement that there isn't one controversial matter existing between USA and USSR that has no solution.

*This is the ³-only reference in
Lorenz's work. High lights*



2003
DATE: 22 December 1953, 1500

PLACE: Col. King's Office

PERSONS PRESENT: Col King, [] Mr Leddy, []

DISCUSSION:

1. Mr. Leddy brought along Ambassador Peurifoy's cable on his six-hour meeting with President Arbenz.

2. Mr Leddy mentioned that the US Ambassadors to Central America were to be recalled to Washington for a briefing in early January. He mentioned this so that CIA could indicate whether this briefing would seem inopportune, or whether CIA wished any specific points to be covered.

3. Ambassador Toriello has asked to see President Eisenhower and will probably get the appointment. The President will be asked to "really pour it on".

4. Secretary Cabot has already told the Ambassadors of the three countries concerned that military pact negotiations are in the offing. This may compel State to make the matter public much sooner than previously intended.

5. Ambassador Whelan is coming up. It was agreed that he should be allowed to know enough so that, if asked by President Somoza, he could give a quiet nod to Somoza's support of RUFUS.

6. Two Guatemalans, anti-Communist politicians, have been to see Mr Leddy, offering to stage anti-Communist demonstrations at the appropriate time. It was agreed that clearances on the two should be started. Col King is having their written proposal copied for SD/ WHD.

7. Mr Leddy was briefed on the three Nicaraguan bases.

8. Mr Leddy reported that State and Defense had agreed not to send to Guatemala the two added non-comm that Guatemala had requested.

9. It was agreed that the US military missions would not be pulled out when the three military pacts were announced, but only when some striking progress was made on the pacts.

[]

JAN 5 Rec'd

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :
Attention:

DATE: 16 March 1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: Julius and Ethel ROSENBERG, Letters Concerning.

1. Following the several conversations between Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted], I have checked all area components of CS on their interest in names and addresses of persons who wrote to President Eisenhower in behalf of subjects prior to their execution. Interest in, and anticipated value of, such information is substantial with respect to the areas listed below.

2. It is understood that you are in a position to review referenced correspondence. It is also understood that review of some 69,000 pieces will be a time consuming undertaking. Therefore if you find that personnel not assigned to your office can have access to these files, please let us know if the loan of CS personnel would expedite and simplify your task.

3. It is requested that names and addresses of correspondents favoring the ROSENBERGS be extracted from reference correspondence wherever such names and addresses are included in the original correspondence, in the case of messages originating in the following foreign areas:

Norway

Sweden

Denmark

Asia Minor with the exception of Iran

All Asiatic countries

Indonesia and the Philippines

All African countries

All Latin American countries

*please ascertain what
problem is presented*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RLE MR Case No. 99-71

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Document No. 4

17 March 1956

Colonel A. J. Goodpaster
Staff Secretary
The White House

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Dear Andy:

I have just received [redacted]
[redacted] a message from a French general and politician who was one of the important characters in the French Underground during the war and who is an old friend of mine:

"General Koenig by direct private exchange messages with President Eisenhower has requested and received invitation visit him in Washington. Intends to make trip very soon. Purpose of visit is General Koenig's desire express to President Eisenhower his views on critical French political situation and suggest as possible remedy the necessity of a national arbitrage to settle differences between the various parties, to be conducted under the auspices of General De Gaulle. He will explain to President Eisenhower that General De Gaulle's unquestionable prestige to effect such an arbitrage is evidenced by the visits he has been receiving from leading personalities of practically all French parties seeking his advice and opinion."

My French general friend, who is very close to General Koenig, adds that he proposes either to accompany General Koenig, or in any event to be present in the United States simultaneously with him.

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DATE: DEC 2002


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
I should be very interested to know whether there is anything to the above report.

No distribution whatever has been made of this message outside of this agency.

Sincerely yours,



Allen W. Dulles
Director



20 July 1956

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

IN REPLY REFER TO: WH

MEMORANDUM FOR: **2003**

SUBJECT: Possible Approach by President Castillo Armas to President Eisenhower Involving a Matter of Interest to []

1. It is requested that the contents of this memorandum be passed on an urgent basis to Mr. Holland for his guidance.
2. [] Headquarters has been advised by [] that President Castillo Armas intends to show to President Eisenhower at Panama a six-page message from the Central Committee of Guatemalan Communist Party exiles in Mexico to the Guatemalan (Communist) Internal Central Committee. It is [] view that Mr. Holland should be aware of this proposed approach and may wish to brief President Eisenhower so that the President will be in a position to determine how he may wish to handle this matter.
3. The report itself is part of intelligence material procured through a covert [] operation. Intelligence elements of Castillo's government under the covert direction of [] agents have effected a penetration of the Guatemalan Communists who made the report in question. Castillo is unaware that the United States Government enjoys this penetration of his intelligence elements and is, therefore, unaware that this is an [] operation. He is, of course, also unaware that President Eisenhower will have received advance notification of the existence of this report. Guatemalan intelligence has, at the same time, possibly with Castillo's knowledge, made a copy of this report available to a U.S. Embassy officer at Guatemala who []
4. It is [] suggestion that, in the event Castillo brings this report to the attention of President Eisenhower, the

DOCUMENT NO. 006
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 CLASS. CHANGED TO TS S 0,989
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
 AUTH: _____
 DATE: _____



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- 2 -

President may wish to congratulate Castillo on the intrepidity of his intelligence people and, if the President feels further comment is desirable, tell Castillo that he hopes that Castillo's intelligence people are making this information available to the U.S. Embassy.

5. It is [] recommendation that the knowledge of this report be restricted to President Eisenhower and Mr. Holland. It is further suggested that, if Castillo chooses to deliver the report to the President, Mr. Holland offer to the President to have it returned to [] As Mr. Holland knows, [] officer, is, during the period of the Conference, attached on temporary duty to the U.S. Embassy at Panama and is in contact with []

6. Should anything in this connection transpire which Mr. Holland feels should be brought to the attention of [] Washington, he may make use of [] communications facilities through []

[]

cc: DCI

WH []

Distribution:

Orig & 1 cc - Mr. []
1 cc - DCI
1 cc - DD/P
1 cc - AC/WH

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NLE MR Case No. 89-341

Document No. 1

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This document consists of 23 pages

Copy No. 1 of 2, Series A

Downgraded To	Secret
Authority Of	<u>NSC</u>
<u>DJH/BBM</u> NLE Date	<u>1/19/00</u>

Please review the bracketed portions.
 The remainder of the document was
 previously declassified under
 NLE 89-341 #1 (appeal)
(NL-11/29/99)



INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPENDITURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IN ACCORDANCE WITH

THE PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION DATED MAY 22, 1957

DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE
 INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, SECTION 5.4(b)(3)

DECLASSIFICATION DATE: April 4, 2001 WDB

(Revised as of 28 January 1959)

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION DATED MAY 22, 1957

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3. Definitions
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5. Operational Limitations
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7. Effective Date

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the Defense of the United States, its Territories
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Paragraph

Title



Section "C" - Special Additional Instructions
Regarding Retaliation in the Event of a
Nuclear Attack Upon the ~~Continental~~ United
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1. Purpose
2. Policy
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3

(Deletion app. by President-ltr. 11/2/59 to Deputy Sec. Def.)

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BASIC INSTRUCTIONS

1. AUTHORITY. These instructions are issued pursuant to paragraph 4 of the President's "Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons" dated May 22, 1957.

2. PURPOSE. These instructions establish policies in the implementation of the Presidential Authorization.

3. DEFINITIONS. The following definitions are established for the purpose of these instructions:

a. The term "nuclear weapons" includes all types of weapons and devices which release atomic energy.

b. The term "United States, its Territories and Possessions" includes the Canal Zone.

c. The term "Authorizing Commander" is a commander empowered to expend nuclear weapons pursuant to subparagraph 5c of the Presidential "Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons."

d. The term "major U.S. forces" refers to those organized units of U.S. military forces comprising the essential operational military strength of the United States, including the numbered field armies, fleets, and air forces and (see subparagraph 6a below) [the forces of Authorizing Commanders.]

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e. The term "attack" refers to a major hostile assault of such magnitude and against such areas or forces as to constitute an immediate and vital military threat to the security of the United States or to major U.S. forces, as defined above.

f. The terms "expend", "expending", and "expenditure" refer to the firing or launching and detonation of a nuclear weapon.

g. The terms "foreign territory" and "territory of foreign friendly countries" include the territorial waters and air space thereof.

h. The term "international waters" includes the air space above.

4. AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES. When the urgency of

4. Authorized Expenditures. When the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead, the Armed Forces of the United States are authorized by the President to expend nuclear weapons in the following circumstances in conformity with these instructions:

instructions:

a. For the defense of the United States, its Territories and possessions:

(Chg. approved by President-ltr. 11/2/59 to Deputy Sec. Def.)

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(1) In the United States, its Territories and possessions, and in coastal air defense identification zones, against attack by air - (Special Additional Instructions in Section "A" below).

(2) In the United States, its Territories and possessions, and in international waters adjacent thereto as defined in Section "B", against attack by sea - (Special Additional Instructions in Section "B" below).

(3) In the territory of friendly foreign countries near the United States, its Territories and possessions, subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned, against attack by air - (Special Additional Instructions in Section "A" below).

b. For the defense of United States forces in foreign territory and in international waters against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces, subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned - (Special Additional Instructions in Section "B" below).

c. In the event of nuclear attack upon the ~~Continental~~ United States, in retaliation against the enemy identified as

(Deletion app. by Present - ltr. 11/2/59 to Sec. Gates)

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responsible for the attack, subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned - (Special Additional Instructions in Section "C" below).



5. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS. Because of the serious international implications of the use of nuclear weapons by U. S. military forces, it is essential that particularly strict command control and supervision be exercised, and that the use of nuclear weapons be limited to circumstances of grave necessity. The authority to expend nuclear weapons in the event urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead, is an emergency measure necessitated by recognition of the fact that communications may be disrupted by the attack. It is mandatory to insure that such authority is not assumed through accident or misinformation. The authorization to expend nuclear weapons should be regarded as an authorization effective only until it is possible, in light of time and circumstances, to communicate with the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead. In the expenditure of nuclear weapons pursuant to these instructions,

(Revised as of May 12, 1960)

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the following limitations will be observed:



- a. An Authorizing Commander may expend nuclear weapons only when the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.
- b. Under this authorization, Authorizing Commanders may not expend nuclear weapons for defense against minor assault nor against assault upon minor U.S. forces wherein damage inflicted would not constitute an immediate and vital threat to the security of the United States or to major U.S. forces.
- c. Any expenditure of nuclear weapons pursuant to these instructions will be limited to such size and numbers of weapons and to such targets as are necessary. Further, nuclear weapons will be used in the manner best calculated to avoid expanding hostilities and with due regard for the safety of friendly forces and peoples.
- d. Nothing in these instructions shall be construed as preventing any responsible commander from taking such actions as may be necessary to defend his command, with the exception that the expenditure of nuclear weapons may be authorized

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only by Authorizing Commanders, utilizing the criteria and procedures set forth in these instructions."

6. RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES. Responsibilities

and procedures applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons, when the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead, are:

a. The Authorizing Commanders are designated in the appropriate Sections below for the purpose set forth therein. In addition, commanders of joint task forces and of other commands, equivalent in stature to the numbered forces, as specifically approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense, may from time to time be designated as Authorizing Commanders by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, in regard to the air defense of the United States, its Territories and possessions, these instructions do not limit the authority granted to operational commanders pursuant to the "Authorization for the Expenditure of Atomic Weapons in Air Defense: approved by the President on 18 April 1956 and the "Policy Statement on Interception and Engagement of Hostile Aircraft", approved 24 September 1952, which were


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
implemented in accordance with the revised "Interception and Engagement Instructions and Procedures", dated 7 December 1956. Previous authorizations to expend atomic weapons in accordance with the revised Interception and Engagement Instructions and Procedures dated December 7, 1956 (attached hereto as Appendix A) are continued in full force and effect.

E.O. 12958
Sec. 3.4(b)(5)



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E.O. 12958
Sec. 3.4(b)(5)

f. An Authorizing Commander expending nuclear weapons pursuant to these instructions shall immediately report his action to the President through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and advise directly all commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff utilizing the most expeditious means available.


g. Upon approval by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the President, separate authorizing instructions will be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Authorizing Commanders designated herein and may be disseminated to



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
subordinate commanders only in those cases where such subordinate commanders have been designated as Authorizing Commanders pursuant to the procedures of paragraph 6a above.

E.O. 12958
Sec. 3.4(b)(5)



The existence of these instructions and the provisions thereof are TOP SECRET classified information and must be safeguarded accordingly. No authority exists short of the President to modify this classification or make disclosures inconsistent therewith. In addition to the classification of TOP SECRET, the fact of the existence of these instructions will be limited to a highly restricted group of people.

E.O. 12958
Sec. 3.4(b)(5)



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h. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will keep the Authorizing Commanders informed of the current status of agreements or understandings with friendly foreign countries regarding the expenditure of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

i. The expenditure of nuclear weapons over Canada will be in accordance with the terms of the interim agreement between the governments of Canada and the United States which was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of Defense on 16 March 1957. The current agreement is effective until 1 July 1959. Any expenditure after 1 July 1959 will be in accordance with then existing agreements.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE. These instructions are effective upon receipt.

Section "A"

Special Additional Instructions for the Defense of the United States, its Territories and Possessions Against Attack by Air

1. PURPOSE. These special instructions provide additional guidance applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States, its Territories and possessions, against attack by air:

a. In the United States, its Territories and possessions

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and in the coastal air defense identification zones (ADIZ's).

b. In the territory of friendly foreign countries near the United States, its Territories and possessions, subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

2. PROCEDURE.

a. The expenditure of nuclear weapons in the United States, its Territories and possessions and in the coastal air defense identification zones (ADIZ's) will be in accordance with the revised "Interception and Engagement Instructions and Procedures", dated 7 December 1956, which are attached hereto as Appendix "A" and are continued in full force and effect.

b. The expenditure of nuclear weapons in the territory of friendly foreign countries near the United States, its Territories and possessions will be subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned and will be in accordance, as closely as the situation permits, with the procedures set forth in the revised "Interception and Engagement Instructions and Procedures", dated 7 December 1956, or such other rules as are applicable to the areas concerned.

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c. As regards the expenditure of nuclear weapons in the air space above international waters outside of the coastal air defense identification zones for the defense of the United States, its Territories and possessions against attack by air, the provisions in Section "B" below will apply.

3. AUTHORIZING COMMANDERS. Authorizing Commanders for the purposes set forth in paragraph 1a of this Section are those military commanders authorized to declare aircraft as "hostile" pursuant to the revised "Interception and Engagement Instructions and Procedures", dated 7 December 1956. Authorizing Commanders for the purposes set forth in paragraph 1b above will be designated in subsequent specific instructions.

Section "B"

Special Additional Instructions for the Defense of the United States, its Territories and Possessions Against Attack by Sea and for the Defense of United States Forces in Foreign Territory and in International Waters Against Sino-Soviet Bloc Attacking Forces

1. PURPOSE. These special instructions provide additional guidance applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons:

a. In the United States, its Territories and possessions and in international waters adjacent thereto, as defined herein, for the defense of the United States, its Territories and possessions, against attack by sea.

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b. For the defense of the United States forces in foreign territory and in international waters, against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces, subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

2. DEFINITION. The following definition is established for the purpose of these instructions:

The term "international waters adjacent thereto", as used in subparagraph 1a above, is defined to include all international waters and the air space above within effective enemy striking range of the United States, its Territories and possessions.

3. ENGAGEMENT. [When the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead, any decision to expend nuclear weapons against attacking forces is the responsibility of the Authorizing Commander in consonance with the criteria set forth in these instructions.]

a. In amplification of these criteria, the situations below may be considered examples of an attack, as defined in these instructions:

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(1) A submarine or surface craft engages in launching or controlling missiles against the United States, its Territories and possessions.

(2) A Sino-Soviet Bloc force engages in launching or controlling missiles, bombing, air-to-air attack, or strafing attack against a major U.S. force in international waters or in foreign territory.

(3) Sino-Soviet Bloc ground, paratroop or other forces make a major assault and thereby effect a significant penetration of an area occupied by major U.S. forces in foreign territory with the evident intention of rendering them militarily ineffective or of continuing the advance.

b. The above list of situations is not all inclusive and does not preclude expenditure of nuclear weapons against assaulting Sino-Soviet Bloc forces under other situations consonant with the criteria set forth in these instructions.

c. Unidentified submarines or aircraft which are engaged in an attack as defined in these instructions may be assumed to be Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces.

d. In defending against attack by air, commanders shall conform as closely as the situation permits to the procedures

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set forth in the revised "Interception and Engagement Instructions and Procedures", dated 7 December 1956, or such other rules which are applicable to the areas concerned.

4. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS.

a. [When the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President:]

(1) [An Authorizing Commander, as designated in subparagraph 5a below and as contemplated in subparagraph 5b below, may order the expenditure of nuclear weapons in international waters and in foreign territory


E.O. 12958
Sec. 3.4(b)(5)

[redacted] subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government (except for a government involved in attack on U.S. forces) exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned, to eliminate the local threat of Sino-Soviet Bloc forces engaging in an attack against United States forces, when in his judgment this is vital to the security of his forces.

E.O. 12958
Sec. 3.4(b)(5)

[redacted]

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E.O. 12458
Sec. 3.4(b)(5)

b. Authorizing Commanders will bear in mind that the above authority to expend nuclear weapons is an emergency measure necessitated by recognition of the fact that communications may be disrupted by the attack. It is mandatory to insure that such authority is not assumed through accident or misinformation. The authorization to expend nuclear weapons should be regarded as an authorization effective only until it is possible, in light of time and circumstances, to communicate with the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.

5. AUTHORIZING COMMANDERS

a. Authorizing Commanders for the purposes set forth in this section are: The Commander in Chief, U.S. - Europe; The Commander in Chief, Alaska; The Commander in Chief, Caribbean; The Commander in Chief, Atlantic; The Commander

(Revised as of May 12, 1960)

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in-Chief, Continental Air Defense; The Commander in Chief, Pacific; The Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) will be an Authorizing Commander for the purposes set forth in this section only when he has been directed to conduct operations as a Specified Commander by the President through the Secretary of Defense. This limitation does not preclude his designation as an Authorizing Commander by CINCEUR in accordance with paragraph 5b below.

b. In addition, commanders of numbered field armies, fleets, and air forces, and commanders of Joint Task forces and of other commands equivalent in stature to the numbered forces may from time to time be designated as Authorizing Commanders by recommendation of a Specified or Unified Commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the President in each such instance.

Section "C"

Special Additional Instructions Regarding Retaliation in the Event of a Nuclear Attack Upon the Continental United States

1. PURPOSE. These special instructions provide additional guidance applicable to the expenditure of nuclear weapons in the event (Deletion app. by President 11/2/59²⁰ see ltr. to Sec. Gates)

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of a nuclear attack upon the United States in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject, in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory, to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.

2. POLICY. In the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States, it is assumed that the President would have approximately the same information as the Department of Defense regarding the strength and character of the attack and the identity of the nation launching it. [Retaliation for such attack, therefore, will be on order of the President, except in circumstances where immediate communications have become impossible between the President and responsible officials of the Department of Defense. In such circumstances, the Secretary of Defense or the next official in the chain of responsibility, acting in the name of the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to expend nuclear weapons in retaliation against the enemy identified as responsible for the attack, subject, in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory, to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.]

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
3. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. When retaliation is ordered by the Department of Defense such orders will be issued through command channels by the Secretary of Defense or by the next official in the chain of responsibility, acting in the name of the Secretary.

b. In the event that a nuclear attack has in fact occurred, as authenticated through prescribed procedures as approved by the President, on the ~~Continental~~ United States and it is impossible to communicate with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expenditure of nuclear weapons for retaliatory purposes may be ordered by an Authorizing Commander. Before ordering such an expenditure under this authorization, an Authorizing Commander will adhere to the following conditions:

- (1) Comply with applicable international agreements or understandings, if any, in expending nuclear weapons for retaliatory purposes from friendly foreign territory.
- (2) Alert his retaliatory forces to the fact that they may be recalled prior to their arrival in the target area.

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



4. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS. The authority to expend nuclear weapons for retaliatory purposes is an emergency measure necessitated by recognition of the fact that communications may be disrupted by the attack. It is mandatory to insure that such authority is not assumed through accident or misinformation. The authorization for expenditure of nuclear weapons for retaliatory purposes should be regarded as an authorization effective only until it is possible, in light of time and circumstances to communicate with the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.

5. AUTHORIZING COMMANDERS. The Authorizing Commanders for the purpose set forth in this Section and approved by the President are listed below:

- a. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic.
- b. The U. S. Commander in Chief, Europe.
- c. The Commander in Chief, Pacific.
- d. The Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command.
- e. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces,

Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, will be an Authorizing Commander for the purposes set forth in this section only when he has been directed to conduct operations as a Specified Commander by the President through the Secretary of Defense.



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AEC file
(1 by Gen St. Croffey)

Downgraded to Secret
By Auth: NSC
on: DJH/BBM 1/19/00

June 30, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
June 27, 1958 - 11:05 AM.

- Others present:
- Secretary Dulles
 - Under Secretary Herter
 - Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
 - Mr. Farley
 - Admiral Strauss
 - Secretary McElroy
 - Deputy Secretary Quarles
 - General Twining
 - General Loper
 - General Cutler
 - Mr. Lay
 - General Goodpaster

Please review the following sections.
The information was previously submitted.
NLE 89-341 #3 (appeal)
(NLC-11/29/99)



DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, SECTION 5.4(b)(3)

DECLASSIFICATION DATE: April 4, 2001 WOB

The meeting was held to consider a draft of "implementing instructions" for a delegation of Presidential authority regarding use of atomic weapons. General Cutler briefly reviewed the status of the matter, bringing out that there are still two points not agreed between State and Defense. The essence of the first point is that there is considerable political advantage in the fact that the authorization for use of these weapons, at the present time, can be given only by the President. The second point is that the authorization to use these weapons in defense of our own forces overseas, without specific political clearance with host countries, would be inconsistent with some of our treaties and agreements with them. The President asked if this provision is restricted to the case wherein nuclear weapons have been used against us, and was told that it was not.

Mr. Dulles said he would not press the timing point, but that he would point out that, should authority be delegated as proposed, we must expect our allies to insist on negotiating conditions of use -- a matter which is now dormant. Mr. Quarles said that foreign military people are stressing the opposite side of the question -- they say they need assurance against the President being unable to act, or communications with him being disrupted, with the result that atomic weapons could not be used. Also, it has seemed to Defense that any attack by Sino-Soviet forces would be a nuclear attack. The President pointed out that if the President should be

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eliminated or out of touch, the Vice President moves up immediately, under the existing arrangement. [He felt that to delegate authority in this matter to a local commander would be getting pretty far out. General Loper said it is not planned to give this authority below numbered Armies, Fleets, or Air Forces. He also pointed out it can be used only to defend "major forces."]




Secretary Dulles reiterated that [if it becomes known the delegations have been made (as it will), there will be a feeling in most if not all countries that the decision ought not to be made by military commanders. The discretion we hope to get will be nullified because foreign governments will take action to curtail it, either by eliminating our forces from those countries or subjecting them to civil authority.] The President stressed the weakness of coalitions as bearing on this matter. He recalled that this was largely the secret of Napoleon's success, which was not seen until Clausewitz wrote about it. He recalled that Clausewitz had stressed that war is a political act -- we must expect the civil authorities to seek control.

Going to the next point, Mr. Dulles said that he feels most strongly that there is no inherent right to use nuclear weapons in self-defense (or otherwise) in violation or nullification of our international agreements. Where there is no agreement, we could go ahead, but we cannot where an agreement precludes. [In some cases our agreements specify that the "use of bases" is subject to joint decision. Further discussion brought out that the authorization could result in an attack on U.S. forces in Germany serving to put France into a war.] General Twining recalled the NATO agreement that an attack on one is an attack on all, and Mr. Dulles recalled that each is committed to act by its constitutional means.

The President stressed the necessity of assuring that we can use our retaliatory power, indicating [a greater delegation might be required for this reason. The practical fact is, however, that we might not go to war for an attack on some of our less critical forces. Mr. Dulles thought we must make the directives subject to existing agreements, in the sense that if we have an agreement that precludes exercise of the authority, we cannot break that agreement.]

The President suggested we should bring in our unified commanders and give them an outline of these procedures, excepting those areas wherein a contrary agreement precludes use of the authority. Mr. Quarles thought the



matter could be resolved by making clear that these instructions do not provide for violation of agreements. Mr. Dulles said that as a practical fact, if the countries themselves are attacked, the matter is not a problem. General Cutler suggested it might be well to approve the instructions and keep them on a standby status to be placed in effect in emergency. The President thought it was better to make the decision on authorization during a period of calm. He suggested the Secretary of State examine all agreements with particular countries with a view to seeing if impediments cannot be removed. Mr. Dulles commented that a revision is needed on the French agreement. Further comment brought out that when the French seek agreement on access to atomic weapons information, that will be a good time to seek to improve the base agreement.

The President said he is very fearful of having written papers on this matter. He believed that orders should be given to the six or seven top commanders specific as to their areas and commands, and in consonance with the instructions as amended. We should keep the general decision very tightly controlled here. The commanders themselves would have to certify that they have not shown the instructions to anyone else.




Mr. Dulles commented that the real right of self-defense for our forces overseas is the fact that an attack on them will involve attack on our allies in whose countries they are located. He and Mr. Quarles agreed that the instructions could be revised to provide that they would not be in contravention of existing agreements. Mr. Quarles said the Defense Department would proceed to draft implementing instructions in line with the document as revised. The President said he would like to see the State Department make such arrangements as it can to remove existing impediments to use of these weapons in self-defense.

At this point Mr. Lay left the meeting and Admiral Clark of Defense and Mr. Harr joined. Admiral Clark gave a presentation on a proposal for operational test firing of nuclear air defense weapons off Eglin Field in the Gulf of Mexico. Mr. Dulles asked as to risk in this test, and Admiral Clark said that while no risk is believed to exist, we can only be sure by testing. The President asked as to the timing of the tests and was informed they are planned for August. He also asked why they could not be held in the Pacific, and was advised that part of the test is to use the weapons in our actual air defense environment.


Mr. McElroy said he feels we must announce the test firings in advance, even though they are conducted in a test firing area where conventional firings are occurring. Mr. Dulles said he had assumed the operation could be handled as routine. If we are going to warn shipping we will alarm Cuba and Mexico.

Admiral Strauss said that the proving out of our system is important. He added that he has concern over the establishment of a third atomic test area. He had urged the Department of Defense to conduct the tests in the Pacific, but understood that Florida fits into their whole defense complex. He recognized that this action may jeopardize our whole test series. He felt we must announce the firings in advance if we decide to have the tests. He was not concerned over the hazards. The single hazard of a rain storm washing down the concentrated radioactivity could be avoided through our weather forecasts. Mr. Herter thought we must inform Cuba and Mexico if we have the tests, and the President suggested we tell them that our normal air defense tests in the area may include some small nuclear shots.

Mr. Herter said there has been some intimation of an intent to conduct a press buildup and have quite a promotional campaign over this matter. The President stressed that nothing like this is to be done. Mr. Quarles said that the public relations features would be cleared through OCB.


A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 May 1958

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Likelihood of Anti-US Demonstrations during Dr. Eisenhower's Central American Tour

1. We believe that, almost certainly in Guatemala and Panama, and possibly elsewhere, the Communists and associated anti-American groups will take advantage of Dr. Milton Eisenhower's presence on his intended tour to stage demonstrations designed to discredit both the United States and the local governments friendly toward the United States.
2. The demonstrations in Lima and Caracas on the occasion of Vice President Nixon's visits to those places were well organized and effective. Although undoubtedly Communist instigated, these demonstrations did give expression to a popular sense of grievances against certain phases of US policy, and the general feeling that with our preoccupation with Europe, Asia and Africa, South America has been relatively neglected. The host governments were, of course, embarrassed, and moderate opinion deplored the excesses of the mob. The general public reaction, however,

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has been that the shock brought South American problems to our attention; nothing else could have done and hence may have long range benefits for the South American countries. It is likely that this fact is understood in Central America and that in at least some of the Central American countries disgruntled people would take the occasion of Dr. Eisenhower's trip to join Communist demonstrations to bring their case likewise vividly to our attention. From the Communist point of view, the demonstrations in Lima and Caracas were at least a temporary success though they did surface Communist agitators and alert the conservative elements to the extent of the Communist danger. The Communists will almost certainly plan to repeat the Venezuela-Peru type of tactics against Dr. Eisenhower in Central America, and will find followers outside of their own ranks, although the ~~High Command in Moscow may urge that they be a bit more temperate~~

3. Existing conditions in Guatemala and Panama are highly favorable for Communist-inspired action. In Guatemala the expectation that President Ydigoras would provide a strong government has been disappointed. Leftist, including Communist, political strength is growing rapidly. The security organization

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has been disrupted by the change of administration. There is no effective control over the return of Communist exiles. Dr. Eisenhower's visit will come during a month in which student disorders are traditional. The students are already in a ferment over unrelated matters. Certain grievances against the United States are already well established in the public mind: the alleged US role in 1954 in the upset of Arbenz, US support for Latin American dictatorships, US "economic imperialism" as symbolized in the minds of the people by the United Fruit Company and other enterprises. Today, the Communists would have no difficulty in finding people eager to demonstrate against the United States in Guatemala.

4. In Panama, powerful ultra-nationalistic politicians are already carrying on a sustained agitation against the government for the softness of its attitude toward the United States, particularly for its failure to assert Panama's claims to sovereign rights in the Canal Zone and to a share in the gross income of the canal. There is already considerable popular irritation against the United States over these issues, over US delay in fully implementing the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty of 1955, and over a general

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deterioration of the economic situation. Moreover, there have recently been serious disturbances among the normally volatile students. Thus ultra-nationalist and Communist agitators could readily exploit existing unrest among the students and the unemployed to stage demonstrations against the United States and the local government on the occasion of Dr. Eisenhower's visit. The fact that Panama would be the last stop on the itinerary would in case of hostile receptions earlier in the trip make demonstrations there the more likely.

5. The governments of the area, except Guatemala, are understood to have given assurances that they can and will control any demonstrations that may occur. The attitude of President Ydigoras of Guatemala has been highly equivocal. While unwilling to admit that he cannot control the situation, he is disturbed about the visit and its timing and has privately suggested that Dr. Eisenhower's visit might well be postponed to a more convenient season.

6. Whether the governments of the area actually can and will make good their assurances is another matter. None of them have a sufficient intelligence capability to be sure of being

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able to anticipate Communist tactics in detail. The security forces of Guatemala and Costa Rica have recently been disrupted by changes in administration. Provided that Dr. Eisenhower consented to avoid close contact with the public, it is likely that he could be protected from the personal indignities to which Vice President Nixon was subjected. However, violent manifestations of anti-US sentiment probably could not be prevented, especially in Guatemala and Panama.

7. "Good will" missions ^{by another service, similar purpose} to areas where the people are looking to the United States for concrete aid or readjustment of policies deemed to be inimical to the interests of the country concerned are likely to become more and more counter productive. Surely this will be true unless the missions are equipped to bring some alleviation of the causes of complaints or at least are ready to give a real hearing to the complaints, real or fancied.

8. The extent of the protests or disorders which may be incident to Dr. Milton Eisenhower's trip is dependent upon two factors which cannot be fully evaluated in advance of the trip but which have been discussed in this memorandum to the extent

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of available information; namely, the determination of the host governments to make the most effective possible use of the security forces available to them (we have already commented upon the inefficiencies of these forces in certain of these countries to be visited); and secondly, whether or not directives will go out from the Communist leadership to make an all-out effort to disrupt the trip as was done in Peru and Venezuela or whether they will prefer at this stage merely to register a protest but to avoid overt incidents. We are rather inclined to believe that at least in Guatemala and probably in Panama, the Communists will be instructed to make a vigorous effort to disrupt the trip.

9. It remains to be noted that if, for the protection of Dr. Eisenhower, it became necessary for local security forces to employ violence against the population, or to call out the armed forces, especially if there were bloodshed, the credit of the United States, in the area and throughout Latin America, would be adversely affected.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

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November 20, 1958

MEMORANDUM

Downgraded To	<i>Secret</i>
By Authority Of	<i>NSC 7/15/61</i>
By	<i>LW</i>
NLE Date	<i>8/14/96</i>



SUBJECT: Discussion at the 387th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, November 20, 1958

Present at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were the U.S. Ambassador to NATO; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Acting Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. The following members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff also attended the meeting: General Gerald C. Thomas, Director; Brig. General Willard W. Smith, Deputy Director; Lt. General Thomas F. Hickey, Director Designate; Colonel Charles L. Granger, USMC, Colonel James O. Beckwith, USAF, Colonel William R. Calhoun, USA, Colonel Lloyd D. Chapman, USAF, Captain Edward L. Dashiell, USN, Colonel Kenneth R. Dyer, USA, Captain David L. Whelchel, USN, DR. R. J. Smith, CIA, and Colonel S. J. West, USAF. Also attending the meeting were the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; Major John Eisenhower for the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. REPORT BY THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
(NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463, 1532, 1641 and 1815;
NSC 5816)

Mr. Gordon Gray introduced General Thomas, the Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, and explained the general purpose

DECLASSIFIED	
<i>MR Appeal</i>	<i>NLE 95-299 Doc 1</i>
By <i>EP</i>	NARS, Date <i>8/9/96</i>

of the meeting. (A copy of Mr. Gray's remarks are included in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

General Thomas summarized the methodology of the report that was about to be given. He pointed out the change which had been made last year by the President in the directive to the Subcommittee and also referred to the use made by the Subcommittee of the current National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities. General Thomas also pointed out the assumptions under which this year's evaluation had been developed and noted the participation in the evaluation of representatives from all four of the military services as well as representatives of each of the other responsible Government agencies.

General Thomas then introduced Brig. General Willard W. Smith, Deputy Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, who discussed the basic assumptions concerning the assumed Soviet attack on the U.S. which was mounted by the Soviets in mid-1961 with strategic surprise. This was followed by General Smith's discussion of the detailed assumptions made by the U.S.S.R. with respect to the nature of the attack which it made on the continental U.S. General Smith followed with a discussion of the detailed assumptions underlying the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union.

Upon the conclusion of General Smith's portion of the report, Colonel William R. Calhoun, USA, described the Soviet attack on the continental U.S. Captain Edward L. Dashiell, USN, subsequently described the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union as well as the U.S. military posture after the attack on the U.S. by the Soviet Union.

Colonel Calhoun next expounded the estimate of the damage inflicted on the U.S. by the Soviet attack and Captain Dashiell described the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union by the U.S. retaliatory attack. Dr. R. J. Smith of the Central Intelligence Agency, also a member of the Subcommittee Staff, discussed the potentialities of the Soviet clandestine attack on the U.S. which concluded the formal presentation.

In his concluding statement General Thomas emphasized the difficulties involved in attempting to achieve realistic assumptions with regard to the evaluation as a whole. There were obviously many uncertainties with respect to the military capabilities of the U.S. at a period as distant as mid-1961 and of course even more uncertainty as to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union at the same time. Despite these uncertainties, General Thomas believed the assumptions were sufficiently realistic to bear out the essential validity of the evaluation.

General Thomas also invited the Council to take a backward look at the previous reports of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in relation to the findings of the report just rendered. There was, he pointed out, an essential similarity in the findings of all the reports since the first one was delivered in 1954. These findings were listed in a chart described as "Recurrent Conclusions".

Mr. Gray reminded the President and the Council that this was General Thomas' last appearance as Director of the Subcommittee Staff, and that his successor, ^{by} General Thomas F. Hickey, was present this morning. Thereafter, Mr. Gray presented a recommendation in substantially the following language:

"You will recall that the 1957 report involved a retaliatory attack confining itself to a primarily military target system. For 1958, the President directed that the exercise concern itself with the retaliatory objective of immediately ~~paralyzing~~ the Russian nation, rather than concentrating on targets of a military character although not entirely ruling out particular military targets which the Subcommittee believed would significantly contribute to paralysis of the Russian nation.

"The presentation you have just heard has concluded that a substantial reduction of the capability of the USSR to recover would be accomplished by the concentration of a U. S. retaliatory effort against a combined military-urban industrial target system as opposed to a strictly military target system. The conclusion also was that such an effort would destroy the Soviet nuclear offensive capability."

"A central aim of our policy is to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the U.S. There has been no suggestion from any quarter as to a change in this basic policy. However, as you know, NSC 5410/1, the so-called 'war objectives' paper is in the process of review. These matters are inextricably interwoven.

"In the light of these facts, it seems to me that it is important for you, Mr. President, to have before you, for your consideration, an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of retaliatory efforts directed toward:

- "1. Primarily a military target system; or
- "2. What might be felt to be the optimum mix of a combined military-urban industrial target system."

"Such appraisal should also take into account the requirements of a counter-force capacity which might conceivably be called upon in the case of unequivocal strategic warning of impending Soviet attack on the U.S. The question here might be whether the character and composition of such a force would be adequate to the purposes of 1 or 2 above, and vice versa.

"These matters have been under intensive study in the Department of Defense. If it is agreeable to you I shall be glad to work with Mr. McElroy and General Twining to determine the best way to accomplish such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the review of the so-called War Objectives paper, bearing in mind that the knowledge and views of the State Department and other Federal agencies would be importantly involved."

When Mr. Gray had concluded his suggested Council action, the President said he was convinced that what Mr. Gray proposed to have done was essential for the obvious reason that in today's presentation of the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union, the U.S. had as targets every city in the U.S.S.R. with a population of over 25,000 people. In view of this very large number of urban targets, the President believed that we must get back to the formulation of the series of targets in the Soviet Union destruction of which would most economically paralyze the Russian nation. Turning to General Twining and addressing him and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President said that he could remember well when the military used to have no more than 70 targets in the Soviet Union and believed that destruction of these 70 targets would be sufficient. Now, however, a great many more targets had been added. He accordingly expressed his approval of the suggested action by Mr. Gray.

Secretary McElroy expressed his view that the dispersal of the hardened Soviet ICBM bases introduced a new element in the picture because even if we succeeded in destroying the cities and urban centers of the Soviet Union, these missile sites would still enable the Soviet Union to retain an add-on capability with their long-range missiles.

In response to Secretary McElroy's point, the President commented that in this morning's presentation the Soviets delivered all of their ICBM's in the first two hours of their attack on the U.S. Secretary McElroy agreed that this was the case but said that there was some doubt as to whether this was a sound assumption as to the Soviet use of their ICBM's. The President replied that the presentation assumed that we are trying to destroy the will of the Soviet Union to fight. If in the first thirty hours of the nuclear exchange

Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-61
(Ann Whitman file)


the U.S. succeeded in accomplishing the degree of devastation in the Soviet Union that had been outlined in this morning's presentation, we would already have accomplished our purpose of destroying the will of the Soviet Union to fight. One could not go on to argue that we must require a 100 per cent pulverization of the Soviet Union. There was obviously a limit - a human limit - to the devastation which human beings could endure.

Secretary McElroy expressed his agreement to the action recommended by Mr. Gray and the President brought the meeting to a conclusion with an expression of warm congratulations to General Thomas and his associates and also a welcome to General Hickey who would be taking over henceforth from General Thomas.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the Annual Report for 1958 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.
- b. Noted the President's request for an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of alternative retaliatory efforts directed toward: (1) Primarily a military target system, or (2) an optimum mix of a combined military-urban industrial target system. Such an appraisal is to take into account the requirements of a counter-force capacity and whether such a counter-force capacity would be adequate for (1) or (2) above and vice versa. The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs are to determine the best means of defining and accomplishing such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the current review of NSC 5410/1 and the interests of the Department of State and other Executive agencies.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for appropriate implementation.



S. EVERETT GLEASON


June 11, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Dr. Killian and Dr. Wiesner saw the President on June 3rd. They summarized conclusions reached in three related reviews by panels of the Science Advisory Committee: one on ballistic missile warning systems, a second on the national response to warning, and a third on defense against ballistic missile attack.

The memo which was the basis for the informal report to the President is attached.




A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

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J. B. Wiesner/6-3-59

MR 76-50 #190
By W. Date 5-2-78

Warning and Defense in the Missile Age



The anticipated inclusion of long-range missiles in the Soviet arsenal will greatly alter the warning and active defense requirements of the United States.

The P.S.A.C. has carried out comprehensive studies of the National needs in these areas and also attempted to judge the potentiality of the various existing programs for satisfying requirements.

We have recently completed three related reviews; one on Ballistic Missile warning systems; one on the National response to warning; and one on the defense against ballistic missile attack.

I would like to anticipate a more complete discussion of the active defense systems with a few remarks which will establish a setting for the discussion of missile warning systems and of associated problem of response to warning.

We do not believe that an active anti-ballistic missile system can be made effective enough against a determined attack to provide significant protection for the civilian population. I will discuss the basis of our position later. We believe that the most significant contribution of active anti-missile defense will be the additional protection it might provide to hardened sites such as missile or bomber bases. It is unlikely that active defenses, even for this purpose, will become available before 1964-65, some time after Soviet intercontinental missiles will have become a very serious threat.

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K-75-6177-1

Because of the uncertainty regarding the ultimate capability of active defense systems and their late availability, we must take other measures to insure our security.

A number of things must be done to insure the survival of our deterrent forces, or as a minimum, to permit them to be launched prior to an attack, so that they are not destroyed on the ground.



A number of methods may be employed to protect the retaliatory force. Among the choices available to us are hardening, dispersal, mobility and rapid response to warning. We believe that these are more certainly effective than active defenses for protection of the retaliatory force. These "passive" tactics are now available, can be implemented to an effective degree relatively soon and can, unless precluded by redundant operational requirements, be more inexpensively effective than active defenses. The Panel believes that these "passive" tactics should be considered as the basic anti-missile defenses for both the aircraft and the missiles of the U.S. retaliatory force. We urge, in the strongest terms, that they be exploited more fully and more rapidly than called for in present plans.

One of the measures for passively defending the retaliatory force -- hardening -- progressively decreases in effectiveness as the aiming accuracy of the attacking ICBM is improved. Therefore, in the long run, active defense, if possible, will become more effective relative to hardening, although not in an absolute sense.

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Though our studies have shown the importance of hardening of the retaliatory forces, we will not give attention to the details of this subject in the present report. Our purpose is to review the problems of warning and response to warning. Our recent review has covered both tactical and strategic warning of missile attack. We also examined the response mechanisms to warning and will have some remarks to make about this subject.

First, on tactical warning of an actual ballistic missile attack. We believe that reliable detection of a missile attack can be obtained by a radar system. We are confident that a properly designed electronic warning system can detect any significant attack with sufficiently low probability of false alarm to be a most important component of our deterrent force. The BMEW System, when implemented, will provide this capability. Unfortunately, the BMEW's system was overly elaborate as first planned and was not going to have any capability until late 1960 or early 1961, some time after its need appears to become critical. The Air Force is now re-examining their schedules. We believe that a limited but useful capability could exist early in 1960 if the system were simplified, and furthermore, that the necessary simplifications would not impair the effectiveness of the system. Information from BMEW's not integrated into warning system.



An alternate type of missile warning system using airborne heat detectors appears quite promising and should, if practicable, be used to augment the radar warning system. This system would observe Soviet missiles during their launch phase and consequently will provide a longer warning time than

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-4-

will the radar system which observes the mid-course of a missile trajectory. It should also be noted that it is practically impossible to spoof this system because it observes the energy radiated during the launch phase of a missile flight and this will be very difficult to imitate.

The usefulness of such warning is often questioned for it is so short, ranging from 10 to 15 minutes to slightly more than half an hour. We believe such warning is vital and when backed with a bomb-alarm system is adequate if proper procedures exist to insure prompt reaction.

A bomb-alarm system which instantaneously and certainly passes the word that a nuclear detonation has occurred is an essential part of any deterrent system which is to have a quick response. Such a system is now being studied by SAC. We believe that the implementation of an effective bomb-alarm system is deserving of high priority.

The bomb-alarm system will function, for it is very unlikely that a major attack employing missiles can be launched in such a manner that most of the targets are hit simultaneously. In fact, it is our judgment that a spread in arrival times of a half-an-hour or more is to be expected. The electronic early warning will provide the information to alert our forces, get SAC alert aircraft into the air, ready missiles, wake up government officials who must authorize a response, etc. The bomb-alarm system, reporting the occurrence of the first explosion will provide the information upon which the decision to respond will have to be based. We shall have more to say about the problems of response to warning later on.

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The warning system discussed above will have a different role as time passes. In the immediate future it will provide the warning necessary to get the SAC alert force off of the ground; without warning the 15 minute alert concept has little meaning. At a later date it will provide the time necessary to ready our missiles so that they can be fired before they are destroyed. Later when we have hardened, or mobile, quick response missiles of the Polaris or Minuteman type, it will only provide some decision time if that is, in fact, needed.

To summarize:

- (1) Electronic warning can be obtained.
- (2) It is necessary.
- (3) Bomb-Alarm System is also needed.
- (4) Both should be speeded up.



As I inferred earlier, the PSAC does not believe that the warning response mechanisms have properly evolved to meet the needs of the missile age. We have recently reviewed the organization and functioning of the National Indicators Center and examined those plans which exist within the Air Force for the use of the warning information discussed earlier, and we believe that the present system and future plans are inadequate in several ways.

The National Indicators Center has the task of watching strategic indicators for information which would alert us of an impending attack prior to an actual penetration of the tactical warning system. The indicators which provide the most useful information at the present time are associated with the Soviet

strategic forces and their air defense system. As time goes on, such information will become harder to get and have less meaning. There are many other kinds of information, now not exploited, which we believe could be obtained.

Other comments regarding the NIC include the following points:

(1) The center does not enjoy adequate priority in the intelligence community to always obtain information it desires, or even to insure its prompt transmission home in competition with administrative communications traffic. Many times information obtained by a particular service or agency is processed and evaluated before it is made available to the NIC.

(2) The Center does not have adequate data processing facilities to insure getting full value from information now collected. The system seems to depend primarily upon the memories of men having area responsibilities.

(3) The functioning of the Center and doctrine for the use of information generated are not adequate to insure any response to a missile attack. We believe that it is necessary to study this problem in detail and to formulate a response doctrine adequate for the missile age and providing alternate procedures for the various conditions which might be encountered. This need exists to insure the effectiveness of both strategic and tactical warning.

Recommendations in Regard to Warning and Response:

(1) Improvements should be made in the handling of strategic indicators including improved communications and data handling.

The possibility of getting useful information from a wider range of indicators should be explored.

(2) Steps should be taken to insure that information from the BMEWS is made available to users as fast as electrical communications permit.

In particular, direct circuits from the BMEWS installations to SAC strategic government centers should be provided.



(3) A bomb-alarm system should be installed as rapidly as possible.

This should be regarded as a matter of highest national urgency.

(4) National policy must be established to insure the prompt and effective utilization of warning information in the missile era.

(5) A primer on warning and response should be prepared to inter-relate types of warning and types of response. Special attention should be given to developing a response doctrine to include various levels and types of response to various kinds of warning information.

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The Nike-Zeus system (as are all AICBM systems) is appallingly complex in concept and in required performance criteria. No system which can approach such performance requirements has yet been demonstrated in test or practice. Nevertheless, the Nike Zeus system is founded on sound technological concepts and the Panel has a high regard for the competence of the technical staff developing the Nike-Zeus equipment. The system appears to have been well designed from a data processing point of view, and the discrimination radar has a very good range resolution capability. It appears that the presently conceived Nike-Zeus system can be made to function satisfactorily, in a technical sense, against simple attacks involving no more than very elementary tactics of confusion by an enemy.



Unfortunately sophisticated decoys appear to be quite easy to make and should be anticipated in any estimate of AICBM performance projected for 1964-65, the earliest time when the Nike-Zeus system can be available.

Our own ICBM offensive plans presently include the use of much more sophisticated measures of confusion, multiple warheads and decoy than the Nike-Zeus can cope with in its present concept. We must reasonably expect that the Soviets will employ similar offensive tactics.

In fact, the defense against ICBM's with high yield multiple warheads, employing tactics of confusion and decoy, is a problem which must be faced continuously from now on.

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Recent research work appears to offer some hope of providing means for the development of more effective decoy discrimination. It appears possible by radar and optical means to examine the characteristics of the ionization cloud produced when the objects enter the atmosphere and distinguish the lighter ones from those that are heavier. This may make it possible to distinguish real warheads from decoys but obviously will not help against multiple warheads.



The discussions concerning decoy discrimination highlighted the urgency and importance of a well-planned program to examine Soviet nose cones during the re-entry phase. Adequate knowledge of the characteristics of Soviet nose cones and of any Soviet decoys which might be developed may be a decisive factor in our ability to confront the enemy with a potentially effective system. The Panel believes that an observation program, carefully planned to obtain as much useful data as possible, is deserving of a major effort. While conventional radar observations and infra-red photographs are useful, they are insufficient for this purpose. Special instrumentation is required to get much of the information believed to be available during re-entry; however, it appears that such instrumentation can be assembled from components which are now available.

High Altitude Effects

The problems of attenuation and refraction which may result from high altitude nuclear detonations, including those of the Nike-Zeus warhead itself, was considered a serious problem prior to the Hardtack tests. It now appears that the principal effect will be a temporary reduction in the range capability of the 500 mc acquisition radar in the direction of the detonation. The Panel believes that the problems associated with beam refraction and radar clutter, resulting from high altitude nuclear detonation, should receive further study in terms of their effect on the overall system capability.

It is apparent that the effects of large nuclear explosions (1 MT), at very high altitudes (100-1000 km), have not received sufficient study. There is serious concern that the effects of such an explosion might persist for rather long times and could adversely affect the Zeus system performance over an extensive region of space. This problem should receive further theoretical study.

The Panel believes that present efforts to provide a higher frequency transmitter and antenna for the acquisition radar are totally inadequate. Furthermore, we feel that it is within the present state of the art to provide the components for higher frequency operation and that their development should be carried out in parallel with the present 500 mc development. This work should receive sufficient support to permit incorporation of the new,

high-frequency components into the initial Zeus deployment rather than permit the less desirable, low-frequency equipment to go into large-scale production.

Hardening

Although one of the publicized advantages of the Nike-Zeus system is the protection of population centers, as I have already said, the Panel feels that any protection which can be achieved in this way will remain far from adequate to influence, in any serious way, the military policy of a potential attacker. We believe that the effective contribution of Nike-Zeus is to be looked for in the problem of protection of the retaliatory force. Whatever the merit of other possible applications, the presently conceived Nike-Zeus system is of doubtful value for the protection of hardened missile bases. This results largely from the vulnerability of major system components to the effects of near-miss nuclear detonations. It is now estimated that the present Nike-Zeus system can only withstand overpressures of the order of 2 psi. By using multiple antenna installations, this weakness can be overcome to some extent and at considerably additional expense; however, this is a glaring weakness in the system.—There is, at the present time, no known way to obtain a really hard antenna system, but this problem is one of sufficient importance to warrant much more attention than it is now receiving. (These comments apply to all of the antennae of the Nike-Zeus, and not to the lens alone.)

The Panel therefore believes it highly desirable to explore all possibilities which may permit the hardening of major Nike-Zeus system components.

We have a somewhat uneasy feeling that there is not enough planning for the future needs in this system. The Panel feels quite strongly that the research programs should be continued and that every effort should be continued to get an experimental system into operation at the earliest possible date. This system should be sufficiently flexible to permit perfection without substantial replacement. At the same time, we urge the initiation of a parallel R&D effort to perfect measures for system hardening, a higher frequency capability for the acquisition radars and an effective capability in the presence of advanced confusion techniques.



We often hear criticism of the Zeus system concept and the proposal that some other arrangement of components would be better. So far there has been no proposal that would not require the development of the very large radars, though possibly in other forms; or the large, high-speed maneuverable missiles planned for Zeus, nor has there appeared a proposal for a system capable of really adequate decoy discrimination.

With the high degree of pessimism the panel shares about the possibility of a highly effective AICBM system based upon the present concepts it is necessary to explain why we believe that the development work should be continued at the present high rate of expenditure, and in fact allowed to increase as planned. Among the most important reasons which, taken together, convince us that the (Nike-Zeus) development must be carried forward are:

- (1) The system will be capable of providing some additional protection for hardened sites. For this use it is obviously necessary to provide

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antennas and other components much harder than those presently planned.

(2) Active defenses appear to be the only means of achieving some protection for cities against attack by missiles. Without challenging the over-riding importance of protection for the retaliatory force, the Panel notes two circumstances in which protection for cities has value:

(a) The condition in which the Soviets have a superiority in missiles great enough that they can direct up to a few hundred, but not as many as a thousand, missiles at cities in addition to those directed at our retaliatory forces. In this case, active defenses would not contribute to preventing attack, but could nonetheless save many lives.

(b) A situation in which offensive forces were limited by an agreement which is politically and technically enforceable. In this case it is possible to consider building even an active defense system which could not be overwhelmed within the limits of agreed forces.

None of the above circumstances can be ruled out as possibilities for the future.

(3) The components being developed for the Nike-Zeus system could provide the radar intelligence required for a quite different intercept system if new ideas should occur. Furthermore the only hope of solving the extremely difficult problems of ballistic missile interception is to

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work at them. In spite of our pessimism we must admit the possibility of a new idea which could change our viewpoint completely. This has certainly happened in the past.



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SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of our study of the current status of the U.S. anti-ICBM capability, the Panel feels obligated to set down the following General Recommendations:

1. The pursuit of an aggressive program to exploit the tactics of dispersal, hardening, concealment through mobility and quick reaction upon early warning as the basic anti-missile defense of the U.S. retaliatory force.



2. The early initiation of well-designed program to observe Soviet re-entry bodies.

Based upon our examination of the Nike-Zeus program we recommend the following:

1. Continuation of the present research and development program in an effort to get an experimental system into operation at the earliest possible date. (This experimental system should be sufficiently flexible to permit perfection without substantial replacement.)

2. The expenditure of a modest sum (150-200 million dollars) if this sum is, in fact, required for developmental production to retain the presently programmed development schedules.

3. The initiation of a vigorous, parallel research and development effort to achieve: (a) a higher frequency capability for the acquisition radars, (b) an effective means for system hardening, and (c) an

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effective system capability in the presence of advanced confusion techniques.

4. Further theoretical investigation of the effects of the very-high-altitude detonation (100-1000 km) of high-yield (greater than 1 MT) nuclear devices on the Nike-Zeus system.



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90630

Executive Registry
11-5776

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brig. General A. J. Goodpaster
Staff Secretary

SUBJECT : Message from the Dalai Lama to the
President and the Secretary of State

1. Attached hereto is the original of the subject message, together with a translation. A copy of the translation has been sent to the Department of State.

2. Accompanying the message the Dalai Lama sent a white silk scarf to the President. This scarf is a gesture of respect and is part of the traditional Tibetan greeting extended to an important person.

SECRET

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Attachments

EO/DCI/JSEarman 17 Jun 59

Distribution:

Original ~~3~~ - Addressee w/atts —

✓ 1 - DCI

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~~1 - [redacted]~~

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(b)(3)

Approved for Release
Date OCT 1999

004375

TRANSLATION

To: The President and Secretary of State of the United States,
President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter,

Your Excellencies:

It is our purpose to say that to all the people of the world who love peace and freedom, the United States is the greatest and most powerful ally.

The American Government has shown great interest in Tibetan affairs and has given help both personal and impersonal. In doing this and by continuing to send us advice and information, I wish to thank you very much for all that you have given to us.

I now wish to say for one purpose that the essential desire of all Tibetan people, central, north, south, east, west, Khamba, and Amdo, all having the same language, religion, and beliefs, and with one will, all together want independence of Tibet.

In the world generally, and particularly in South East Asia, it is very important to have peace. Your support is even more important now than it was before. Please confer and plan whatever strategy is necessary in regard to giving Tibetans independence. Please present this plan at some time in the future when the discussion arises at the United Nations about recognition of Communist China. Eventually we will tell you what will be the necessary things to do.

The American Government, President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter: please give us advice regarding our affairs and what you propose to do.

With this scarf, from Mussoorie in India

Dalai Lama (signature)

1959/5th month/26th day

Downgraded from ~~Secret~~
By Authority of NSC
by DJH/Bam DATE 11/8/00

November 2, 1959

Please refer to the following references.
TITLE
FILE 89-341 # 5 (appeal)
(NL-11/29/99)



Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have studied your letter of October 6, 1959, on the subject of instructions for the expenditure of nuclear weapons, and more specifically, the instructions to be issued to Unified and Specified Commanders in connection with my Basic Authorization of May 22, 1957, and the Implementing Instructions of February 17, 1959.

All the provisions covered in your letter of October 6, 1959, are satisfactory to me, and I approve them, including the changes recommended by my staff, with the following exceptions:

(a) The penultimate paragraph, page 2 of Inclosure #1 to your letter needs to be revised. I am concerned that this paragraph as written could easily be misinterpreted by Authorizing Commanders as giving license to ignore the restrictions set forth in these documents if the situation were to appear serious enough as to threaten destruction of their forces. Therefore, it seems best to me to eliminate this paragraph. It has been suggested that this difficulty could be averted by deleting the words "utilizing the criteria and procedures set forth in these instructions" and substituting therefor "observing the criteria, procedures, and restrictions set forth in these instructions." This, however, in eliminating the dangers inherent in this paragraph, also appears to deprive it of any meaning. While I would prefer the deletion of this paragraph altogether from this and related papers, I solicit your views as to its value.

(b) With regard to the basic letter of May 22, 1957, I would like to have added to paragraph 2. b the words "subject to limitations in accordance with international agreements."

DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, SECTION 5.4(b)(3)

DECLASSIFICATION DATE: Apr. 4, 2001 WLB

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Two other points also present themselves:

(a) I approve with reluctance the change in wording in paragraph 2. a (3) of the May 22, 1957, letter. I am informed that the reason for this new wording throughout these documents is to give CONAD, in the absence of agreements with Mexico, authority to fire air defense weapons with atomic warheads over Mexican territory. I will go along with this wording as an interim measure; but I am asking the Department of State to begin negotiations immediately with the Mexican Government to attain an agreement which will provide such permission.

(b) Paragraph b (3), on page 2 of your letter of October 6, 1959, refers to supplementary guidance to the Authorizing Commanders with respect to "procedures" for obtaining consent of the Government, if required. I expect this supplementary guidance to be submitted to me when it is prepared.

I cannot overemphasize the need for the utmost discretion and understanding in exercising the authority set forth in these documents. Accordingly, I would like you to find some way to brief the various Authorizing Commanders on this subject to ensure that all are of one mind as to the letter and the spirit of these instructions. Preferably, I would like to see this done in a small symposium, consisting only of the Commanders concerned. Perhaps the annual conference at Quantico could provide an opportunity to do this without the publicity which would attend calling a special meeting.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Honorable Thomas S. Gates
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

51
10 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with General Eisenhower: Mr. McCone and Mr. Forrestal present

Essential points were as follows:

1. McCone and Forrestal described the current military situation which has grown out of the fall of Nam Tha and the retreat of the Phoumi forces some 85 miles southwest and across the Thailand border, pointing out that Phoumi forces did not offer resistance though they had numerical superiority and that this situation had occurred previously in the Plaine des Jarres and elsewhere.

2. Phoumi's intransigence politically had foreclosed the formation of a government of national union in which those same political elements would be present as were represented in the last Souvanna Phouma government during the Eisenhower administration. The effort was not a coalition, but was a neutral government with a firm commitment to keep Laos free from Communist intrusion.

3. The political and military situation which has evolved confronts us with only two alternatives:

a. The accomplishment of the national union government under Souvanna with Phoumi's participation or,

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

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DATE: APR 2002

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

b. The use of U. S. forces in Laos with possible assistance from the Thais but not others and with very little likelihood of strong military activity by the Laotians themselves because of their demonstrated inadequacies.

Eisenhower's views might be summarized as follows:

1. He questioned McCone closely as to whether Souvanna was a Communist, stating that he was convinced when Souvanna fled Laos and resided in Cambodia that he had turned Communist. McCone stated every check indicated Souvanna was not a Communist though he was a weak man.

2. Eisenhower stated that every government irrespective of what it was called, which incorporated Communists and others, eventually was taken over by the Communists. For that reason he was opposed to the proposed Souvanna government but he did not refer to that government as a "coalition government."

3. Eisenhower dwelt at length on the danger to South Vietnam and Thailand as both will be outflanked if Laos is in Communist hands and concluded that such a situation would be so critical to Southeast Asia and so important to the U. S. that most extreme measures, including the commitment of U. S. forces to combat in Laos, were justified.

4. Eisenhower urged a partitioning of Laos into Northern and

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2002

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

Southern sectors with the line as far north as possible and that to accomplish this we should support General Phoumi and his forces. When McCone pointed out Phoumi's demonstrated inadequacies, Eisenhower stated he named Phoumi because he thought he was a strong leader but recognized some alternate might be desirable.

5. McCone and Forrestal pointed out that this would involve a commitment of U. S. troops, very possibly with no assistance from other countries. Eisenhower replied that this would be proper, defensible, that he would support it and he felt the Congress would support it. At this point he urged that the President go before the Congress and seek a resolution authorizing him to act in Southeast Asia, the resolution being similar to those passed by the Congress at Eisenhower's request in connection with Formosa and the Middle East. McCone stated that he seriously questioned Congressional approval, citing Russell's statement. Eisenhower responded that he was sure that Congress and the people would support such a resolution and he personally would use his influence with his Party and the Congress to assist its passage.

6. Throughout the conversation, General Eisenhower expressed concern over a compromise position. He frequently compared the

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~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

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DATE: APR 2002

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Souvanna arrangement with earlier compromises in China and stated that his sampling of public opinion indicated a desire for the U. S. to demonstrate strength rather than compromise. He expressed great confidence in Thailand and also in President Diem of South Vietnam.

7. Finally Eisenhower warned of the consequences of losing Southeast Asia, pointing out that if it is lost, nothing would stop the southward movement of Communism through Indonesia and this would have the effect of cutting the world in half.

John A. McCone

Dictated but not read.

Orig - Handcarried to The President by Walter Elder 5/10/62
lcc: Mr. Mike Forrestal by hand on 5/11/62
lcc: Memo for Record file

- 4 -

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2002

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Mr. McCone

Executive Registry

ED. 62-3211

May 11, 1962

#51

MEMORANDUM

Addendum to Memorandum for the Record of May 10, 1962

SUBJECT: Discussion with General Eisenhower; Mr. McCone and Mr. Forrestal present.

Among the comments made by General Eisenhower in an off-the-cuff and most probably in an unconsidered manner were the following:

If he were sending troops into Laos, he would follow them up with whatever support was necessary to achieve the objectives of their mission, including -- if necessary -- the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

General Eisenhower recalled that when he first came into office, the Korean War had been going on for two years, and a policy had been established that foreclosed military strikes north of the Yalu. He said that this had been a mistake; and that the enemy should have been hit at his sources of supply.

cc: Mr. McCone
Mr. McG. Bundy *10 15 33 bis .ES*

MVForrestal
llw

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

OK

#119

noted by [unclear]
WE



13 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of General Eisenhower in his office at
Gettysburg, Friday, September 11th - 8:30 - 10:30 a. m.

1. I recalled that I had briefed General Eisenhower on August 6th, immediately following the incidents of the Gulf of Tonkin.

2. I reviewed the developments since early August in South Vietnam, reporting to Eisenhower the actions taken by Khanh following the Tonkin incident, i. e., declaring a state of emergency and the decree reorganizing the government. This was followed by popular uprisings, the withdrawal of Khanh from the government, the conduct of government by Deputy Prime Minister Oanh, the return of Khanh, the reestablishment of a government under a triumvirate, the positioning of Big Minh as titular head of the government and the restoration of a very fragile, but at the same time, a peaceful situation in Saigon. I emphasized the fragility of the situation, my concern over the deepening schisms between Catholics and Buddhists, Dai Viets and other political entities, segments of the military and various political or religious sects. I said for this reason CIA estimated the future was very ominous and that we believed chances of continuing a reliable government in South Vietnam were less than even. I also commented on my concern about the deep down purposes of the Buddhists and its leader Tri Quang and also the anti-American sentiment which had been expressed though very minor might grow. I reported that the military situation was remaining "as is" with no attempt by the VC to capitalize on the confused political situation, that the Vietnamese military commands were carrying on, that the Communists were attempting political infiltration as the best means of capitalizing on the situation.

Eisenhower felt the situation most critical. He had no suggestions to offer.

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2. Reviewed briefly the situation in Laos, the attempts to reach an understanding through negotiations in Paris, the fact that de Gaulle had put his prestige on the line but that so far the talks had made no progress whatsoever. I commented on the difficulty of assessing the Communist attitude following the Tonkin Gulf episode as evidenced by Peiping's accusation of Moscow supporting the U. S. in Southeast Asia, the relatively moderate response from Hanoi and Peiping, the willingness of Souvannaphong to go to Paris and the absence of dynamic military action on the part of the Pathet Lao. Eisenhower felt that these situations were difficult to assess but they might be holding back for fear of more serious strike by the U. S. forces.

3. I summarized the situation in Cyprus and the stalemate that had been reached in the negotiations and the dangers inherent in the Cyprus situation because of Makarios' invitation for help from Nasser and Khrushchev. Eisenhower continues to feel that some sort of partition of Cyprus is the only solution to the problem. This view he has expressed to me on numerous occasions.

4. I reported that the Congo situation had improved in the last 30 days. Tshombe had come out better in the African conference than we had expected, that he had handled himself quite well, and while he had not received actual military assistance, he had not lost the gain because the conference had refused to hear or recognize the rebel government.

(b)(1)S

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

5. With respect to Malaysia-Indonesia situation, I reviewed the issues, the passage of the British fleet unit through the Sunda Straits and the probability that the fleet would return in the next few days which might cause a confrontation between Great Britain and Indonesia. I expressed the view that the British were going to back up the Malaysians and support them against any overt or excessive guerrilla operations by the Indonesians and that a serious situation might develop at any time.

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6. I brought Eisenhower up to date on Cuba and advised him that we expected that shortly after the election Castro would strongly oppose U-2 reconnaissance over Cuba and very possibly attempt to shoot down a U-2 plane. I said we were working towards having the O ready to introduce if this situation developed, but not at all sure that we would do so. I reported all significant current intelligence on Cuba.

7. Reviewed the most recent Soviet military developments as covered by briefing memorandum and also the status of the estimate on ChiCom Advance Weapon Development, most particularly the test site at Lop Nor and the

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

8. Reviewed my proposed trip with Eisenhower. He expressed great interest in it and its purposes and specifically asked that his personal regards be extended to General de Gaulle.

[REDACTED]

28 January 1965

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Dear General:

You will recall that on recent occasions I have told you General DeGaulle persists in stating to both U.S. representatives and to representatives of foreign countries with whom he is visiting that he made specific concrete proposals concerning the organization and direction of NATO in August 1958 but was never given a reply. He undoubtedly was referring to his proposal for a three-power directorate of world affairs with which you are thoroughly familiar. As you will recall a comprehensive reply was given to him in writing. Furthermore it is my understanding that you discussed the DeGaulle proposal with him personally at Rambouillet and elsewhere and made a counter proposal to him, details of which you and I have recently gone over.

I have discussed the response to the DeGaulle proposal with Chris Herter, Livie Merchant and Andy Goodpaster and they all recall the facts exactly as you recently outlined them to me.

I assume that you will see DeGaulle in London or Paris. In fact, I hope you do as I believe you are the only man in the U.S. who can have any influence on him and can open up a dialogue which might pave the way to a better understanding. At least you might persuade him that his present statement that "the United States never gave him the courtesy of an answer to his letter," is not consistent with the facts.

Please consider this a personal communication between us as I have not discussed this idea with anyone here. I am sorry that I did not know you were in Gettysburg yesterday as I would have preferred to discuss this subject in person.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

John A. McCone

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

MAY 2010

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This document may be
downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED
when enclosure is detached.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

JAN 25 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT : CIA Comments on Proposed Handling of the Recommendations
of the Report to the President by the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
dated December 20, 1956

Herewith are the CIA comments, subject as above, as requested
in your memorandum of January 17, 1957.

Allen W. Dulles
Allen W. Dulles
Director

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
JUN 17 1997

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p. 1 of 7

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JAN 25 1957

CIA COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED HANDLING OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S BOARD
OF CONSULTANTS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
dated December 20, 1956

1. We do not believe that drastic changes in the structure of our national intelligence organization are required to make progress toward some of the objectives we outline below. We do suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence be encouraged to exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility and we feel that he can do this within the intent of existing laws. If directed and supported by you in discharging this responsibility, the Director of Central Intelligence can accomplish much in the direction of integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination within the national intelligence effort without change in present statute or organization.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for action.

CIA Comment: Concur.

2. To insure the proper functioning of the Intelligence Community and to guarantee proper coordination with the military in times of war, we suggest that a realistic appraisal of the Community's organization and responsibilities be undertaken at once. This should be undertaken directly by the Director of Central Intelligence, and he should report his appraisal and recommendations to the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for action.

CIA Comment: In concurring it is our understanding that the entire paragraph relates to the functioning of the intelligence community in times of war. In preparing the above-mentioned report the Director of Central Intelligence would as a matter of course consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of the service intelligence agencies.

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3. We urge that action be expedited to bring the National Intelligence War Plans to the highest feasible state of readiness and that a realistic war-gaming of them begin as soon as practicable.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for action.

CIA Comment: It is our understanding that the term "National Intelligence War Plans" refers to "planning for intelligence activities in time of war" and we suggest this change be made.

We also suggest that the proposed handling be changed to: "Approve, and refer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence for action."

This revised suggested handling is proposed since we believe that it is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence to plan for intelligence activities in time of war; this planning may differ depending upon whether these activities are carried out in or outside of theaters in which American Forces are engaged in active combat operations. For example, we consider that:

a) over-all intelligence planning should be conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

b) intelligence requirements for support to Military War Planners by CIA should be developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence;

c) planning for those intelligence activities to be conducted by Military elements should be the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

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d) planning for those intelligence activities conducted by Central Intelligence Agency elements, whether or not in or through theaters of war, should be the function of the Director of Central Intelligence and coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate.

e) war-gaming of activities planned under both b) and c) above should be conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. With regard to the integration of the Intelligence Community, we are convinced that a strong centralized direction, under which the resources of the various elements would be brought closer together, would do much to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its cost. We therefore recommend that action be taken toward this end, both through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for action together with 1 above.

CIA Comment: Concur.

5. With regard to clandestine operations, we urge that present practices be regularized to insure that in all appropriate instances these projects (1) receive the benefit of proper joint staffing and formalized approval, and (2) that both the State and Defense Departments be kept abreast of the developments of these projects on a need-to-know basis and, of course, under tightly guarded security procedures.

Suggested handling: Refer to the representatives designated under NSC 5412/2 for study, consulting with their principals, and report thereon to the President.

CIA Comment: Concur.

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- 6. We feel that a definite need exists for the coordination of the "unattributed" programs of the United States Information Agency and of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in the field of propoganda, and we urge that action toward this end be initiated at once. It is our opinion that such action could well begin with a review of the actual practices which have grown up under the "Principles to Assure Coordination of Gray Activities" enumerated by the Operations Coordinating Board on 24 October 1953.

Suggested handling: Refer to the Director, United States Information Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence for study and report thereon to the National Security Council.

CIA Comment: Concur.

- 7. To give proper high-level direction to Communications Intelligence Activities and to insure that their tremendous capabilities can be exploited to the fullest, we believe that they should have the direct management attention of a single Assistant Secretary of Defense. We therefore suggest that one be designated for that purpose.

Suggested handling: Refer to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent and the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman, USCIB, under NSCID No. 9, for study and report thereon to the President.

CIA Comment: Concur.

- 8-a. We suggest that you lend your prestige to the recruitment of personnel to study [redacted] This program, at your request, might possibly be managed by the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization; or by the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the Department of Defense.

1.5(c)(g)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
(SECRET)

Suggested handling: Refer to the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman, USCIB, to prepare, for consideration by the [redacted] (Secretaries of State and Defense) in consultation with the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommendations to the President as to the best channel and method for recruiting such personnel.

1.5(c)(g)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
(SECRET)

CIA Comment: As we understand it, there are two points to this recommendation; first, a successful mobilization of the best available talent to attack the problem of [redacted] and second, to use this talent to search out the most promising lines of research and development. In view of the

1.5(c)(g)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
(SECRET)

fact that the Department of Defense is Executive Agent of the Government for the production of COMINT information (NSCID No. 9), and that the National Security Agency with the approval of USCIB has been developing a program for dealing with the [redacted] [redacted] problem referred to in recommendation 8-a. above, we suggest that the handling be as follows: "Refer to the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Chairman of USCIB, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization for report promptly to the President. This report should deal with the two recommendations required; namely, (1) who should be recruited and how; and (2) what body in the executive branch should supervise the development of the most promising lines of research and development."

1.5(e)(5)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
(SECRET)

8-b. We strongly support efforts now undertaken by the Department of Defense to develop [redacted]

1.5(e)(5)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
(SECRET)

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Secretary of Defense for action.

CIA Comment: We concur, but suggest the substitution of the word "material" for "information".

9. We recommend that the National Security Council review their Intelligence Directives and substitute a more coherent, consolidated Directive or set of Directives for the conduct of our intelligence activities under today's conditions.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for review of all NSCID's and for early submission to the National Security Council (through the NSC Planning Board) of recommended revisions.

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CIA Comment: We concur in the reference to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for review of all NSCID's, and recommend that the revised Directives be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Security Council.


10. To relieve the Director of Central Intelligence of the many management responsibilities he is presently called upon to discharge as Head of the Central Intelligence Agency, we suggest that he be provided with a Chief of Staff or Executive Director who would act as his "Executive Vice President". This assistance would thereby enable him to direct his efforts more toward the integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination that is necessary within the national intelligence effort.

Suggested handling: Refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for recommendation to the President as to the best method of accomplishing the purpose of this recommendation.

CIA Comment: Concur.

REPORT
ON THE
COVERT ACTIVITIES
OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~TOP SECRET~~


b(1) b(3)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DEC 1999

SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

Washington, D.C.

30 September 1954

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your verbal directive, confirmed by your letter of 26 July 1954 (Appendix A), the undersigned have made a comprehensive study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. We have carefully examined its operations in this area. We have also given due consideration in our study to the Agency's overt activities and to its relationship with the intelligence community as a whole.

Our findings are embodied in the attached report. For your convenience, conclusions and recommendations are summarized on pages 10 to 18. With these we are in unanimous agreement.

We cannot speak too highly of the assistance and cooperation that has been given to us by the Central Intelligence Agency at all levels, and by the other agencies of Government and individuals contacted.

We are particularly indebted to our Executive Director, Mr. S. Paul Johnston, and to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne of the National Security Council, both of whom have worked with us throughout and whose assistance has been invaluable.

Respectfully yours,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
J. H. Doolittle, Chairman

[REDACTED]
William B. Franke

[REDACTED]
Morris Hadley

[REDACTED]
William D. Pawley

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REPORT
ON THE
COVERT ACTIVITIES
OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. INTRODUCTION

The acquisition and proper evaluation of adequate and reliable intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of Soviet Russia is today's most important military and political requirement. Several agencies of Government and many thousands of capable and dedicated people are engaged in the accomplishment of this task. Because the United States is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police state enemy whose social discipline and whose security measures have been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, the usable information we are obtaining is still far short of our needs.

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As long as it remains national policy, another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accomplishment of this mission.

In the carrying out of this policy and in order to reach minimal standards for national safety under present world conditions, two things must be done. First, the agencies charged by law with the collection, evaluation and distribution of intelligence must be strengthened and coordinated to the greatest practicable degree. This is a primary concern of the National Security Council and must be accomplished at the national policy level. Those elements of the problem that fall within the scope of our directive are dealt with in the report which follows. The second consideration is less tangible but equally important. It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States

is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

Because of the tight security controls that have been established by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the problem of infiltration by human agents is extremely difficult. Most borders are made physically secure by elaborate systems of fencing, lights, mines, etc., backed up by constant surveillance. Once across borders -- by parachute, or by any other means -- escape from detection is extremely difficult because of constant checks on personnel activities and personal documentation. The information we have obtained by this method of acquisition has been negligible and the cost in effort, dollars and human lives prohibitive.

The defection of Soviet and satellite personnel offers a more profitable field for exploitation. The Agency is properly focusing a great deal of its effort

in this direction, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The information obtained from this source has been of value but is sporadic and incomplete.

A still greater potential lies in communications intelligence. This leads to the conviction that much more effort should be expended in exploring every possible scientific and technical avenue of approach to the intelligence problem. The study group has been extensively briefed by C.I.A. personnel and by the Armed Services in the methods and equipment that are presently in use and under development in this area. We have also had the benefit of advice from certain civilian consultants who are working on such special projects. We are impressed by what has been done, but feel that there is an immense potential yet to be explored. We believe that every known technique should be intensively applied and new ones should be developed to increase our intelligence acquisition by communications and electronic surveillance, high altitude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissance with manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceanographic studies, physical and chemical research, etc.

From such sources may come early warning of impending attack. No price is too high to pay for this knowledge.

In the short time that has been available to us we have been intensively briefed by the Director and staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, by the rest of the intelligence community, and by the principal users of the intelligence product. We have conferred with representatives of other interested Government agencies and with certain knowledgeable individuals whose past experience and present thinking have made their views of value. The procedures which have been followed, and the list of witnesses who have been heard are detailed in Appendix B, attached. Our findings and recommendations follow.

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II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency in general we conclude: (a) that its placement in the overall organization of the Government is proper; (b) that the laws under which it operates are adequate; (c) that the established provisions for its financial support are sufficiently flexible to meet its current operational needs; (d) that in spite of the limitations imposed by its relatively short life and rapid expansion it is doing a creditable job; (e) that it is gradually improving its capabilities, and (f) that it is exercising care to insure the loyalty of its personnel.

There are, however, important areas in which the C.I.A. covert organization, administration and operations can and should be improved. The Agency is aware of these deficiencies and in many cases steps are being taken toward their solution.

While we believe our study to have been as comprehensive as possible in the time available to us, we realize that it is not complete. We are well aware of the tremendous problems facing the Director and staff of an organization such as C.I.A. and appreciate the sincere efforts being made to solve them.

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In an attempt to be constructive and in the hope that we may be helpful, we make the following recommendations:

A. With Respect to Personnel

That the Agency personnel competence level be raised. The Agency should continually strive to achieve this and if necessary reduce its present work load to expedite its realization. Necessary steps are:

1. Elimination of personnel who can never achieve a sufficiently high degree of competence to meet the C.I.A. standard. This will entail a substantial reduction in present personnel. There is no place in C.I.A. for mediocrity.
2. Review and improvement of recruitment plans and procedures in order to obtain higher quality applicants for Agency jobs. The time required to process them should be reduced.
3. Continual improvement of the present excellent training facilities and capabilities in all covert activities to keep step with future requirements.
4. An intensified training program to include those key personnel in the covert services who require additional training, by rotation through C.I.A. training facilities. At present at least 10 percent of total covert personnel should be in training.

5. Assignment to field stations and to country areas of only those people who are fully qualified to handle the highly specialized problems involved.

6. Maintaining the position of Director above political considerations in order to assure tenure and continuity as in the F.B.I.

B. With Respect to Security

That greater security be developed at all levels of the Agency to the end that the good name of the United States and the fulfilment of C.I.A.'s important mission may not be jeopardized. The following steps should be taken to accomplish these objectives:

1. Elimination, to the maximum extent practicable, of provisional and preliminary clearances in the security processing of prospective Agency personnel.

2. Improved and more standardized security processing of alien operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services overseas.

3. Immediate completion of full field investigations and polygraph examinations of the several hundred Agency personnel who have not yet been fully processed.

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4. Establishing of uniform and tighter security procedures at headquarters and suitable safeguards in the field the better to insure the security of the Agency's facilities, operations, sources and methods.

5. Insurance of the closest possible coordination of the counterespionage activities of the covert services with the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect and eliminate, any penetrations of C.I.A.

6. Augmentation of the present sound policy of polygraphing all new employees and all personnel returning from overseas assignments to include periodic rechecks of all personnel, on a more comprehensive basis, whenever effective counterintelligence practices indicate.

7. Creation of greater security consciousness on the part of all personnel by improving initial indoctrination courses and by conducting regular "security awareness" programs.

8. Imposition of severe penalties upon employees at any and all levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security.

9. Establishment of a uniform system for the submission by all overseas missions of regular reports on the status of personnel, physical, documentary and

related elements of security. Such reports should be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the Inspector General and to the appropriate division of the Deputy Director of Plans.

10. Periodic security inspections by the Security Office of overseas missions and of DD/P's divisions, staffs and facilities in the United States.

11. Rigid adherence to the "need-to-know" requirement as the basis for dissemination of classified intelligence developed by the covert services and for intra-Agency dissemination of classified data.

12. Continuous indoctrination and guidance to correct the natural tendency to overclassify documents originating in the Agency.

13. [REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED]

16. Formulation for immediate implementation of emergency plans and preparations, geared to the specific needs of each overseas mission and station, to insure, as far as possible, adequate safeguarding of personnel and safeguarding or destruction of material, in the event of emergency.

17. Concentration of C.I.A.'s headquarters operations in fewer buildings with increased emphasis in the interim on improvement of the physical security of C.I.A.'s many buildings and the classified data and materials contained therein.

C. With Respect to Coordination and Operations

That one agency be charged with the coordination of all covert operations in peacetime, subject to the provision that necessary flexibility be achievable in time of war. The covert operating capabilities of C.I.A. must be continually improved. Steps toward these ends are:

1. Implementation of NSC 5412 which now makes C.I.A. the coordinating agency pending a national emergency.

2. Preparation and test of a readily implementable plan for the immediate and effective availability of local covert assets to theater commanders at the outbreak of war in their areas.

3. Immediate resolution, by the National Security Council, of the misunderstandings that still exist between C.I.A. and some of the Armed Services with respect to "agreed activities."

4. Development of better understanding between other agencies and C.I.A. relative to exploitation of Soviet and satellite defectors.

5. A greater interchange of information, at all working levels, between C.I.A. and the military services regarding their intelligence programs and policies.

6. [REDACTED]

7. Establishment of definite world-wide objectives for the future, and formulation of a comprehensive long-range plan for their achievement.

8. [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

D. With Respect to Organization and Administration

That an intensive organizational study be made to the end of streamlining functions, clarifying lines of responsibility and authority, reducing overhead and increasing efficiency and effectiveness. From our relatively brief examination of organization it is obvious that:

1. The present elaborate staff structure of the Deputy Director for Plans should be simplified.

2. The covert organization should be so located, organized and administered as to maintain maximum security with reference to personnel and activities.

3. The Inspector General should operate on an Agency-wide basis with authority and responsibility to investigate and report on all activities of the Agency.

4. The activities of the Operations Coordination Board under the N.S.C. should be broadened to provide the D.C.I. with adequate support on the more important covert projects.

5. Despite the recommended reduction in present personnel and budgetary economies that the C.I.A. must continue to grow in capacity until it is able to meet, entirely, its national commitments.

6. Centralized accommodations, hand-tailored to its needs, should be provided to house the Agency.

E. With Respect to Cost Factors

That although the activities of C.I.A. should be expanded, costs of present operations should be reduced. This can be in part, accomplished through:

1. The exercise of better control over expenditures for all covert projects, and specifically that (except for those of an extremely sensitive nature) they be made subject to review and approval by the Agency's Project Review Committee.

2. Furnishing the Comptroller (under proper security provisions) with sufficient information on all covert projects to enable him to exercise proper accounting control on a fiscal year basis.

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III. DISCUSSION

Introduction - History and Growth of C.I.A.

The Central Intelligence Agency is an organization of mixed origins and recent growth.

The overt side of C.I.A., well described by the Agency's title, took over in 1947 from the former Central Intelligence Group. It receives the intelligence collected by all government agencies, processes it, disseminates and files it. This phase of the work is well administered under the Deputy Director of Intelligence and serves the whole intelligence community. Since 1947 it has grown to its present size of approximately [REDACTED]

The covert side of C.I.A. started with O.S.O. (Office of Special Operations) which was a remnant of the former O.S.S. Next came O.P.C. (Office of Policy Coordination) which was the "Cold War Shop," an offshoot of the State Department. The two operated under C.I.A. in virtual independence of each other until they underwent a shot-gun marriage in 1952, and were put under a Deputy Director for Plans. This covert side now numbers approximately [REDACTED] in the regular table of organization, and approximately as many more engaged in special projects, or about [REDACTED] in all.

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Supporting and serving Intelligence and Plans are about [REDACTED] more persons, of whom about [REDACTED] are grouped under a Deputy Director for Administration, and about one-third are under Directors or Assistant Directors reporting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence himself, as in the case of Personnel, Training, and Communications. The work of these [REDACTED] is largely in support of covert operations, as the requirements of the overt intelligence side are relatively simpler, whether for training or for support.

Additional personnel on special projects bring the current total to approximately [REDACTED]. In 1947 the total was less than [REDACTED]. This represents a [REDACTED] increase in seven years.

(Note: Throughout this report we have considered as "covert" all activities that are not "overt." Specifically, we have included under "covert" the operations assigned to the Agency by NSC 5412 as well as its clandestine espionage and counterespionage operations.)

A. The Personnel Factors

The most important elements in the successful conduct of covert intelligence operations are the people who run them, -- from top management down to the agent under deepest cover. First consideration, therefore, must be given to the recruitment, selection, training and evaluation of the most highly competent people available. They must then be assigned to jobs where they can be used most effectively and be given whatever support they require to enable them to carry out their missions.

In the past this Agency has not been entirely successful in achieving this result. In its short history it has suffered from lack of continuity in policy direction and management. At its inception it suffered from an inheritance of mixed and sometimes mutually antagonistic elements from O.S.S. and other predecessor agencies. Then, at a stage when still groping toward a stabilized peacetime program, it was suddenly called upon to meet the requirements of the Korean War.

Under this pressure it "ballooned" out into a vast and sprawling organization manned by a large number of people some of whom were of doubtful competence. Of necessity, sensitive positions were sometimes filled with people having

having little or no training for their jobs.

Fortunately, the Agency did possess an invaluable asset in the form of a hard core of capable and devoted men as a part of its World War II inheritance, and did succeed in attracting to this cadre an appreciable number of capable people. In some areas they have done, and are doing, an excellent job, but it appears from a personnel standpoint, that C.I.A. tends to accept more commitments than are warranted by its human assets. This leads us to the belief that an immediate re-evaluation of all programs should be undertaken by the Project Review Committee to eliminate those of lesser importance and to cut back the activity rates of all but the most essential to bring the over-all program into a more realistic coincidence with current Agency capabilities. When improved recruitment, adequate training and over-all experience level justify, Agency activity may again be accelerated.

We have made a study of the educational and experience background of the 34 key people in the Agency's chain of command. From this the following composite figures emerge: all are natural born U.S. citizens; they range in age from 38 to 66 yrs., averaging 47.9 yrs; 32 are married; 17 have 1 or more dependent children; 21 are wholly dependent on

government salary; all but 2 are college graduates; 13 have advanced degrees. Twelve have had 1 or more years business experience; all but 6 have served in the U.S. Armed Forces; 15 have had intelligence experience (O.S.S., Armed Forces, etc.) prior to 1947; and 10 have had specialized C.I.A. training. Of this group 32 have had 3 years or more service with C.I.A., 20 have had 5 years or more, and 15 have been with the Agency for the full 7 years since it was established in its present form in 1947.

The Office of Personnel supplied an excellent statistical study covering [redacted] staff employees and agents on the roster as of 30 June 1954 from which the following data were taken: males make up 58 percent of total, females, 42 percent; average age is 34.2 years and two-thirds are in the 25-39 year age bracket. As for education, approximately 68 percent of the total are high school graduates, some 47 percent have B.A. (or equivalent) degrees, and about 24 percent have done post-graduate work or possess advanced degrees. Forty-five percent have served 3 years or more with the C.I.A. Looking at prior intelligence experience, which includes service with the Armed Forces or with the Agency's predecessor organizations, and realizing that all Agency personnel do not require such training, 71 percent had none, but 29 percent have had 1 year or more and 11 percent 2 or more years. Of the Agency total, 73 percent have had

some foreign language training or experience, and nearly half have had some prior foreign area knowledge. Slightly over 50 percent are Armed Service veterans.

From the above we feel that the present personnel potential of the Agency is reasonably good. There is convincing evidence, however, that "dead wood" exists at virtually all levels. We have heard critics remark to the effect that there are too many ex-military people. We have been advised that some people coming back to headquarters from overseas assignments are sometimes not assigned to new jobs for long periods. Uncertainties in policy, frequent internal reorganizations, together with competition from industry frequently cause good people to seek employment outside. As in other governmental agencies, there is a tendency through inertia or because of a desire for financial security, for the mediocre to stay. As a result, despite the continual and necessary acquisition of additional good people, the competence level of the Agency is not rising as rapidly as is desirable. Prompt and drastic action to increase the rate of improvement is indicated. We are of the opinion that a planned reduction of at least 10 percent in present personnel can and should be achieved without reducing the amount and quality of Agency output.

We have been briefed on the Career Service Plan by means of which the Agency hopes to increase personnel stability. Whether the plan will achieve this result is as yet unknown, but it will not in itself solve the Agency's personnel problems. Nevertheless we believe that a sound Career Service Plan is desirable and should be implemented as promptly as possible.

The C.I.A. has a recruitment program operating in colleges and universities throughout the United States. This program has not been entirely successful in producing either the quantity or the quality of applicants needed for Agency requirements.

In part, this is due to the general shortage of technically trained people vis-a-vis heavy current demands by industry in practically all fields. On the other hand we have heard criticism from scholastic sources that the C.I.A. approach, both to the school and to the individual, is not what it should be, and furthermore, that many potentially good people are lost because of the very great length of time that now elapses between initial contact and entry into the job.

Clearance of new personnel at present averages 90 days. The F.B.I. takes only 30 days maximum for clearing its own personnel. Although we appreciate fully the special problems involved in C.I.A., we believe it is both practical and essential to reduce the present 90 day period as much as possible.

Many applicants find the necessary clearance procedures unpalatable and annoying. Some are repelled by misunderstanding of the purpose of polygraphic examination and the techniques employed. Some (particularly in scientific fields where future professional reputation may depend upon publication of papers, etc.) are unwilling to accept the implications of a lifetime of anonymity, or of life under a pseudonym. We do not suggest that these requirements be abandoned or relaxed in any degree. We are certain that they are necessary for maximum security and success of covert operations. But some better means of approach should be developed to assure the prospective employee that he is necessary, and to persuade him that in this Agency he can find a desirable career and at the same time perform a vital service to his country.

We have been impressed by the excellence of the Agency's training facilities and the competence of its instructor personnel. Our comment is that insufficient use is made of

these facilities. It is obvious that the language, communication and clandestine agent training centers which we inspected are being operated far under capacity levels. This, of course, is a reflection of the slacking off in recruiting programs, but it suggests also that adequate use of the facilities is not now being made to improve the over-all quality of Agency covert activities by new training or refresher training of personnel already in the Agency.

We are aware that the present tendency of the Agency to take on more work than it can handle satisfactorily has limited optimum use of the training facilities, but it cannot be repeated too frequently that in C.I.A. covert operations quality is more important than quantity. A small number of competent people in a sensitive agency can be more useful than a large number of incompetents. In the long run it will pay to stop some of the less essential operations now to permit 10-15 percent of Agency covert personnel to go into training. As the backlog of inadequately trained personnel is reduced and the competence level of Agency personnel increased, this percentage may be lowered.

B. The Security Factors

Nothing is more important in the planning and execution of C.I.A.'s covert activities than continuing recognition at all levels throughout the Agency of the importance of security in all of its aspects. Although many sound and important security steps have already been put into effect by the Agency, in view of the outstanding importance of C.I.A.'s mission to the national security, constant effort must be made to improve security wherever possible.

We have been thoroughly briefed by the Security Office of the Deputy Director of Administration (DD/A), and by appropriate offices of the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) on personnel, physical, documentary, operational and cover security. We have examined the Agency's methods of screening out undesirable applicants or present employees by interrogation, field investigation and polygraph techniques. We have also examined DD/P's methods of processing alien operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services overseas.

We believe that C.I.A.'s security clearance criteria for prospective Agency personnel are sound. Without exception, they should be fully adhered to in practice. The granting of provisional or other interim clearances should be minimized. Full background investigations and polygraph examinations

should continue to be prerequisite to hiring for all positions. Individuals now on the rolls who have not had the benefit of these full security clearance procedures should be so processed at the earliest possible date. (At the time of our study there were [redacted] headquarters and [redacted] field personnel who had not been polygraphed because they had entered on duty prior to the institution of the polygraph program in 1948.)

We are impressed with the competent manner in which the polygraph program is handled in the Agency and with the results obtained therefrom. Polygraph examination has proved extremely useful in [redacted]

[redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

We endorse the Agency's continuation of the polygraph program as an aid to investigation and interrogation as long as the present high standards govern the use of this device.

There is considerable room for improvement in existing security processing procedures for alien operational personnel. Because some personnel must be used for immediate short term operations, it may sometimes be difficult to apply full security clearance procedures to them. [redacted]

[REDACTED]

A uniform requirement should be established for the submission by all overseas missions of regular

reports on the status of personnel, physical, documentary and related elements of security. Such reports should be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the Inspector General and the appropriate division of DD/P. We recommend that periodic security inspections should be made by the Office of Security of all overseas missions and of DD/P's headquarters and other facilities in the United States. Tighter security procedures at headquarters and particularly in the field will better insure the security of the Agency's facilities, operations, sources and methods. Implementation of these recommendations should aid in raising the level of security throughout the entire Agency, particularly throughout the covert services.

If such a system of reporting and inspecting is adopted, the Director can, for the first time, look to one office for the security of the entire Agency. He will then have a more precise and timely picture of security-related developments throughout the Agency.

We cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of the continuation and intensification of C.I.A.'s counter-intelligence efforts to prevent, or detect and eliminate penetrations of C.I.A. We endorse fully the present counter-intelligence practices of the Agency which include

polygraphing all personnel returning from overseas assignments, automatic security checks and file reviews of personnel being considered for transfer in the field or reassignment at headquarters, security checks of personnel nominated for special types of clearance, etc. We do not think that periodic re-investigation of all personnel is now necessary, but we believe that comprehensive rechecks of personnel should be made on a selective basis whenever sound counter-intelligence practices dictate. Questionable cases should be intensively investigated and expeditiously resolved.

The counterespionage activities of the clandestine services can be one of the most fertile sources of information concerning attempted penetrations of C.I.A. Appropriate steps should be taken to insure the closest possible coordination of DD/P's counterespionage activities in this field with the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Office of Security. Any penetration attempt made against C.I.A., whether it involves Agency personnel and/or clandestine intelligence operations, can never be fully controlled and exploited until all information concerning such attempts -- whether made in the United States or overseas -- is channeled through one focal point, preferably the Security Office.

"Security consciousness" is an obvious "must" for all C.I.A. personnel. Constant efforts should be made to improve the Agency's security indoctrination courses. Regular "security awareness" programs should be inaugurated in order that all personnel may be reminded of the continuing need for "security consciousness" in the conduct of their day-to-day affairs.

Most breaches of security committed by C.I.A. personnel appear to be inadvertent rather than intentional. The net effect of such breaches on the national security is the same regardless of intent. Without exception, an inflexible attitude must be adopted with respect to security breaches and severe penalties meted out to employees at all levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security.

Too easy access to much of C.I.A.'s classified data is a potential source of trouble. Except for the tight restrictions drawn around super-sensitive material, large segments of C.I.A.'s files are open to inspection and use by Agency personnel without qualification as to "need-to-know." Improvement is needed in carrying out the "need-to-know" rule as a basis for intra-Agency, as well as interdepartmental, distribution of C.I.A.'s classified data. This situation

is aggravated considerably by the fact that there are too many duplicate records. The security of C.I.A.'s data is further jeopardized by a tendency to over-classify documentary data originating in the Agency, a condition which operates in derogation of the security classification system as a whole.

Considering C.I.A.'s unduly dispersed headquarters buildings in the Washington area), its physical security program is reasonably good. The potential security risks inherent in such wide-spread dispersal make it essential that the Agency continue its efforts to consolidate the headquarters facilities into fewer, more adequate buildings.

The physical security measures in effect at C.I.A. installations which were visited in the general vicinity of Washington are excellent. The physical security of overseas installations visited by representatives of our study group appeared to vary with local circumstances and conditions. The limited number of inspections made was not sufficient to allow of definitive conclusions as to the general security of all overseas missions. There appear to be, however, no basic, minimum physical security requirements governing these missions or stations, except for the safeguarding of classified documents. We believe that acceptable minimum standards should be promulgated

immediately and that regular inspections by qualified Security Office personnel should be made to enforce them.

Detailed plans and preparations should be made for immediate implementation of war-emergency measures by all overseas missions and stations, tailored to the local conditions. They should provide for maximum safeguarding of Agency personnel and operations, and for adequate safeguarding or destruction of classified data and material in the custody of the installations in question.

Secure cover is an inherent part of all clandestine operations. The security of some of the Agency's cover devices is excellent, security of others is inadequate. Cover security is a problem that requires continuous and exhaustive study. Detailed standards and procedures, policies and regulations, should be issued for the guidance of the personnel concerned. There is need for more adequate briefing of personnel departing for overseas assignments concerning the cover of their missions and their personal cover problems.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A like hazard exists if a person is hired on the outside by the organization without first obtaining a complete clearance from the Agency.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C. Coordination and Operations

The success of the covert operations of C.I.A. depends upon how efficiently they are conducted and how well they are coordinated with other agencies of the Government. These criteria prevail both in peace and in war, but both coordination and operations are necessarily somewhat different during each of these periods. Peace in any ordinarily accepted sense of the word, appears to be impossible of achievement in the foreseeable future. The covert operations of the Agency must therefore be planned and coordinated in order to meet the requirements of a continuing cold war situation as well as the requirements of possible hot war. C.I.A. has this obligation under NSCD 5412 (March 15, 1954).

Looking toward the possible outbreak of actual hostilities in any theater of operations, a detailed plan should be developed now delineating the wartime headquarters responsibilities of C.I.A. to insure that appropriate policy guidance, integrated with N.S.C. and J.C.S. plans, be furnished to C.I.A. representatives in the field. In an emergency situation time obviously will not permit referral of all critical covert operational questions to Washington.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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by the N.S.C. In the settlement of this dispute, in addition to recognizing the right of the Armed Services to perform counterintelligence activities for the security of their own installations and personnel, the Armed Services should be allowed to engage in espionage and counterespionage operations (provided they are coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence) until such time as C.I.A. has the capability to perform all espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United States.

In order to avoid undue delay in the resolution of such problems in the future, the Director of Central Intelligence (as coordinator of all foreign intelligence) should report regularly to the N.S.C. on the status of efforts to implement N.S.C. directives, with particular emphasis on major unresolved questions.

Inasmuch as the exploitation of Soviet and satellite defectors outside the United States has been a source of annoyance (and even hostility) on the part of some of the military services and other agencies toward C.I.A. and vice versa, we believe that steps should be taken immediately to insure full implementation of the defector program in accordance with the spirit and letter of NSCID 13 (Jan. 19, 1950).

The misunderstandings which exist between C.I.A. and the Armed Services stem largely from insufficient exchange

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of information and coordination with respect to espionage, counterespionage, and covert operations. We have been advised, for example, that in certain instances C.I.A. operators appear to have been too secretive with respect to information which is of direct interest to the military services and vice versa. We have been told of incidents where important covert operations have been "blown" because C.I.A. and military intelligence units were operating against each other, without knowledge of each other's interest or activity.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A lack of knowledge of plans, facilities, and operations seems to exist in some areas between the Pentagon and C.I.A. Compartmentation can be carried too far. Improvement in collaboration at the working levels is particularly essential.

Relations with C.I.A.'s other principal customer, the Department of State, also are not entirely satisfactory. In Washington, coordination seems to be reasonably good with well-established liaison channels, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As a result, people have worked at cross purposes, with unfortunate results. It is realized that there are situations in which disclosure of plan and purpose should be held to a minimum number of people, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

D. Organization and Administration

In the course of investigating the covert operations of the Agency, we were briefed on the organization of the individual components of the DD/P complex. We also had the benefit of the thinking of a number of key Agency people with respect to the DD/P organization as a whole. As a result certain general observations with respect to DD/P organization have emerged which are germane to the problem of the efficiency and economy of its operations.

From the remarks that have been made on the subject of Agency history and personnel problems, it is clear that the organization is still in an evolutionary stage. It has suffered from a mixed inheritance, a lack of policy continuity, tremendous pressures to accept commitments beyond its capacity to perform, and a mushroom expansion. As a result there has been an absence of long-range planning with consequent organizational difficulties. We are strongly of the opinion that further streamlining of organization, clarification of functions, and straightening of lines of authority will result in more and better work with fewer people at lower costs.

The covert activities of C.I.A. fall under the direction of the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P). They are presently conducted by a complicated organization of a mixed straight-line

and functional type in which staff has been superimposed on staff to such an extent that duplication of effort, conflicting command authority, and division of responsibility have inevitably resulted in dilution of the total effort.

There are six principal staffs in the DD/P complex ranging in size from [REDACTED] people, totaling [REDACTED]. These are superimposed over seven area divisions ranging in size from [REDACTED]. Five of the staffs have subordinate divisions, and two of the staffs have subordinate staffs. In addition, each of the divisions has its own set of staffs. Altogether, the DD/P complex totals over 40 major units.

We are strongly of the opinion, based upon our limited review of the DD/P element, that consideration of a complete reorganization of the element is needed. As an indication of the type organization that might be more effective and less costly, we have included in this report for consideration purposes only, a revised organization chart as Appendix D. A chart of the present DD/P organization is also included, for purposes of comparison, as Appendix C. The personnel contemplated under the revised DD/P organization would number

approximately [redacted] less than are presently employed by this element.

In considering any reorganization, we cannot emphasize too strongly our feelings with respect to the need for greater security in all DD/P operations. As the covert side of C.I.A., it should operate with a maximum of anonymity. Knowledge of its physical location, operation and the identity of its personnel should be kept on an absolutely need-to-know basis.

We feel that continuous inspection and closer control (both fiscal and operational) over covert activities are necessary. We realize that certain security risks are involved but we believe they can be handled properly.

The subject of fiscal control, and the relationship of the Comptroller to the organization are discussed under Section E following.

The concept of an Inspector General for the Agency is sound. He should report only to the Director. He should be given the greatest possible latitude and authority to inspect all aspects of the Agency at any time, including the Director's own office and the DD/P complex. We believe that any limitations that have been placed on this function in the past should be completely removed.

Because of the rapid expansion of the Agency, its operations are conducted in some [redacted] buildings in the Washington area. Some of these buildings are of temporary wartime construction and constitute a fire hazard. This forced decentralization of operations results in great loss of time of personnel whose duties require them frequently to visit various buildings of the Agency; it increases security problems; and it results in a great reduction in over-all efficiency. We recommend that sympathetic consideration be given to the Agency's effort to obtain funds with which to provide centralized accommodations for its activities, and we suggest that these accommodations would best serve the peculiar requirements of the Agency if they were hand-tailored to its needs. We are of the opinion that in a relatively short time the expenditure required would be self-liquidating.

Although in the present organizational plan of the Government C.I.A. seems to be well integrated into the Intelligence Community at the National Security Council level, events have occurred recently [redacted] which indicate that gaps exist in high level planning and coordination of important covert operations which may expose the U. S. Government to unnecessary risks of compromise. Over-all policy guidance comes from N.S.C., and is satisfactory,

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but better coordination is needed for the more important covert activities of C.I.A. at the national level. This is the function of the Operations Coordination Board, but at the present time it does not appear to be giving the Agency adequate guidance and advice on the more important covert projects. The activities of the Board should be broadened in order to provide the D.C.I. with the support he needs on such projects.

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E. The Cost Factors

The budgetary procedures of the Agency were reviewed with the Agency Comptroller and representatives of the Bureau of the Budget and appear to be satisfactory. Between the fiscal years ended June 30, 1947 and 1955 the total budget has increased from approximately [REDACTED] the latter figure including a reserve fund of [REDACTED]. The 1955 fiscal year budget exclusive of the reserve fund is divided approximately as follows:

Direct costs:

Covert operations [REDACTED]

Overt operations [REDACTED]

Indirect or support costs: [REDACTED]

Since indirect or support costs are relatively proportionate to direct costs, the total budget may be considered to be approximately [REDACTED] for covert and [REDACTED] for overt operations.

The number of civilian employees of the Agency under personnel ceilings has increased from [REDACTED] at June 30, 1947, to an estimated [REDACTED] for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, and military personnel has increased during the same period from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. The aggregate of [REDACTED] for the fiscal

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year ending June 30, 1955 will be allocated as follows:

Covert operations:

[REDACTED]

This total does not include individuals under contract, who are not regular employees of the Agency, individuals under deep cover and those engaged in [REDACTED] and indigenous personnel. The aggregate of persons in these categories is estimated at [REDACTED], most of whom are engaged in covert operations.

The actual number of individuals to be engaged on Agency activities for the fiscal year 1955 will, therefore, be approximately [REDACTED]

The covert operations of the Agency are budgeted and accounted for on a project basis except for headquarters and overseas support costs. Political and psychological and paramilitary projects exceeding a specified minimum dollar total are in general reviewed and approved by a Project Review Committee. Foreign Intelligence projects are not subject to review by this committee but are authorized by

the Director of the Agency, the Deputy Director of the Agency, the Deputy Director of Plans, or certain other individuals depending upon the estimated dollar costs of individual projects. We believe that for purposes of control and as an aid in auditing, Foreign Intelligence projects (except those of an extremely sensitive nature) should be made subject to review and approval by the Project Review Committee.

Due to DD/P's present secrecy policies with respect to Foreign Intelligence projects, the Comptroller of the Agency is unable to maintain meaningful records showing the expenditures made for individual projects in this category. The Foreign Intelligence Staff keeps certain records of such expenditures but on the basis of a calendar rather than a fiscal year. We believe that the Comptroller should be furnished with information which will enable him to record, control and account for the costs of the individual projects of this element of the Agency. Adequate protection for security purposes can and should be provided within the Office of the Comptroller.

Certain other projects in the political and psychological and paramilitary areas, of a sensitive nature are occasionally developed and processed without full information with respect thereto being given to the Deputy Director for

Administration and the Comptroller. Since, of necessity, the funds must be made available by the Comptroller, it is inevitable that he will have knowledge that operations of this nature are being conducted and it is unlikely that more specific information relating to the projects can long be kept secret from him. In one particular instance where substantial sums were expended, the Comptroller was called upon to make the expenditures with no supporting data being furnished to him at the time or at any future date. When we requested breakdowns of costs of the operation we found that they were available only in the area division involved and that they were incomplete and unsatisfactory. We are of the opinion that this deviation from the normal procedure of placing upon the Comptroller the responsibility of accounting for expenditures is unsound, and is not justified by the claim that the security of the operation is improved by this deviation.

We are of the opinion that the administrative plans for individual covert projects are not in all instances as complete in detail as is desirable and that if they were amplified the Comptroller and the Auditor-in-Chief would be in a much better position to carry out their respective duties and responsibilities.

IV. APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

C O P Y

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

26 July 1954

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, USAFR
Washington, D. C.

Re: Panel of Consultants on Covert Activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency

Dear General Doolittle:

I have requested you, and you have agreed, to act as Chairman of a panel of consultants to conduct a study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. With your concurrence I have invited Messrs. William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William Pawley to act with you as members of the panel. Mr. S. Paul Johnston has kindly agreed to serve as Executive Director of the panel.

It is my desire that the Panel of Consultants should undertake a comprehensive study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, in particular those carried out under the terms of NSCID #5 of August 28, 1951, and NSC 5412 of March 15, 1954. You will consider the personnel factors, the security, the adequacy, the efficacy and the relative costs of these operations and, as far as possible, equate the cost of the over-all efforts to the results achieved. You will make any recommendations calculated to improve the conduct of these operations. To the extent that agencies of the Government, other than the Central Intelligence Agency, are engaged in covert operations which may parallel, duplicate, or supplement the operations of CIA, you may investigate such other operations conducted by any other department or agency of the Government in order to insure, insofar as practicable, that the field of foreign clandestine operations is adequately covered and that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort or expense.

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In view of the particularly sensitive nature of these covert operations, their relation to the conduct of our foreign policy, and the fact that these sensitive operations are carried on pursuant to National Security Council action approved by me, I desire that your report be made to me personally and classified TOP SECRET. I will determine whether or not the report or any part thereof should have further dissemination. I should appreciate it if your report could be available to me prior to October 1, 1954.

As you know, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, generally known as the Hoover Commission, is constituting a Task Force to study and make recommendations with respect to the organization and methods of operations of the CIA. General Mark W. Clark has been designated by Mr. Hoover to head this Task Force which, I understand, will probably be organized and start its work sometime in September next. Under the law constituting the Hoover Commission, the Task Force shall study and investigate the present organization and methods of operation of the Agency to determine what changes therein are necessary to accomplish the policy of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service by:

- a. recommending methods and procedures for reducing expenditures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient performance of essential services, activities and functions;
- b. eliminating duplication and overlapping of services, activities, and functions;
- c. consolidating services, activities, and functions of a similar nature;
- d. abolishing services, activities, and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of Government;
- e. eliminating nonessential services, functions, and activities which are competitive with private enterprise;
- f. defining responsibilities of officials; and
- g. relocating agencies now responsible directly to the President in departments or other agencies.

As the work of the Hoover Task Force will get under way shortly, I suggest that you and General Clark confer in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work as between you. The distinction between the work of your Study Group and of the Hoover Task Force is this:

You will deal with the covert activities of the CIA as indicated in paragraph (2) above, and your report will be submitted to me. General Clark's Task Force will deal largely with the organization and methods of operation of the CIA and other related agencies within the limits prescribed in the law as outlined in paragraph (4) above. Reports of the Hoover Commission are made to the Congress.

The purpose of these studies, both that of the Hoover Task Force and that of your Group, is to insure that the United States Government develops an appropriate mechanism for carrying out its over-all intelligence responsibilities and the related covert operations. I consider these operations are essential to our national security in these days when international Communism is aggressively pressing its world-wide subversive program.

Sincerely,

/S/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

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APPENDIX B

PROGRAMS AND PROCEDURES

In early July, 1954, President Eisenhower verbally directed James H. Doolittle to form a Special Study Group to conduct an investigation and to report to him on the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The other members of the Group included William B. Franke, William D. Pawley, and Morris Hadley. Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, of the National Security Council Staff, was designated as consultant to the Group. Mr. S. Paul Johnston, Director of the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences, was appointed Executive Director. The terms of reference for the project were spelled out in the Presidential directive of 26 July 1954 (Appendix A).

The first meeting of the Study Group (excepting Mr. Hadley and the Executive Director, neither of whom had been appointed by that date) took place in C.I.A. headquarters on 14 July. On that occasion the Director of Central Intelligence and key members of his staff

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presented the over-all problem from the viewpoint of the Agency.

The Group as a whole met for the first time in its assigned space in C.I.A. headquarters on 29 July. The Chairman outlined his views as to the job to be done and the procedures to be followed. A program of briefings which had been prepared by Agency personnel in the interim was discussed and accepted. The non-C.I.A. agencies to be heard were agreed upon and the program outlined below was initiated. The schedule of the hearings and a list of all witnesses heard by the Group is attached.

At the request of the Group extensive briefings were arranged by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the three Armed Services, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of the Budget. In most cases the documentation from which briefings were conducted was made available for Group study.

A number of individuals whose knowledge and background seemed pertinent to the study were invited to present their views. Others were consulted informally by various members of the Group. The Chairman discussed intelligence matters of interest to the Atomic Energy Commission with its Chairman, Mr. Lewis L. Strauss. He also discussed matters of

cooperation between the two committees with Ex-President Herbert C. Hoover and General Mark W. Clark, U.S.A. (Ret.)

Several field trips were taken during the course of the study. The entire Group visited [REDACTED] and later the Office of Communications Staff Training installation. During the week of 13 September the Chairman, accompanied by [REDACTED] made an inspection of representative C.I.A. stations in Western Europe, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Because of the extremely sensitive nature of most of the paper work made available to the Group, special precautions were taken with respect to its handling and security. No such papers were taken out of the immediate office area except under suitable precautionary measures, and all working papers, files, or other records have either been destroyed or returned to their source. This Group has developed no archives.

The fact that the Group was able to cover so much ground in such a limited time stems from the assistance and cooperation that was received from the Agency at all levels. The Director took personal and continuing interest in seeing that the Group had all needed facilities and

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information. Particular credit must be given to Brig. Gen. J. D. Balmer, U.S.A. (Ret.), who was assigned as Liaison Officer for the Group, and his two aids, Lt. Cmdr. E. I. Carson, (USNR), and [REDACTED]. They laid on briefing schedules, set up conferences, came up with needed information promptly and arranged for local transportation. Without their help the job accomplished would have been vastly more difficult. Mention must be made also of the assistance rendered in connection with the "general housekeeping" needs of the Group. Everything needed, including numerous requirements for complicated air and rail travel arrangements, was promptly and efficiently handled by the Agency administration people.

Particular thanks are due to [REDACTED] the sole secretarial assistant of the Group, for her efficient and effective handling of all paper work and other day-to-day office requirements.

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SPECIAL STUDY GROUP - DAILY LOG

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Presented by</u>
14 July	C.I.A. Covert Activities	Allen W. Dulles Frank G. Wisner Richard Helms [REDACTED]
29 July	Planning "Cold" War Planning "Hot" War	[REDACTED]
30 July	Foreign Intelligence Communications Intelligence Psychological & Paramilitary	[REDACTED]
3 August	Collection & Dissemination	[REDACTED]
4 August	Technical Services Functions, Dep. Dir./Intelligence State Department	Henry F. Holland
5 August	Security Services [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
6 August	Training [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
7 August	Field Trip - [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
10 August	Coordination OCB and Defense Clandestine Records [REDACTED] State Department	W. Bedell Smith
11 August	[REDACTED] Technical Services [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Daily Log -- 2

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Presented by</u>
12 August	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
13 August	Director's Staff Meeting Admin. - [REDACTED]	Allen W. Dulles & Staff [REDACTED]
17 August	[REDACTED] Inspection & Review Inspector General	Frank G. Wisner [REDACTED] Lyman Kirkpatrick
18 August	Special Operations Clandestine Planning Committee Research & Development	James Angleton [REDACTED]
19 August	Field Trip [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
24 August	U.S. Air Force Intelligence	Maj.Gen. J.A. Sanford & Staff
25 August	Federal Bureau of Investigation [REDACTED]	A.H. Belmont Samuel Papich [REDACTED]
26 August	Intelligence Acquisition	[REDACTED]
27 August	Office of Naval Intelligence	Rear Adm. C.F. Espe & Staff
31 August	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] David E. Murphy [REDACTED]
1 September	U. S. Army, G-2 National Security Agency	Maj.Gen. A.G. Trudeau & Staff Lt.Gen. R.J. Canine & Staff
2 September	State Department	W. Park Armstrong & Staff

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Presented by</u>
3 September	Special Operations General Comments	James Angleton
4 September	Personnel Management Operational Security Special Briefings	[REDACTED] Richard Helms
13-18 Sept.	Field Trip [REDACTED] (Lockwood & Coyne)	[REDACTED] Bronson Tweedy [REDACTED] Claire Boothe Luce
14 September	Bureau of the Budget Functions, Inspector General	Robert M. Macy Lyman C. Hamilton Lyman Kirkpatrick
15 September	[REDACTED] Administration	Maj.Gen. A.G. Trudeau Brig.Gen. R.A. McClure [REDACTED]
16 September	Defense Dept., Intel. Operations Security	William H. Godel [REDACTED]
17 September	National Security Council	Brig.Gen. Robert Cutler James S. Lay, Jr.
22 September	Agreed Activities	[REDACTED]
28 September	Special Briefing [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE CONSULTED

1. Central Intelligence Agency

[REDACTED]

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
Abbott, W. B.	USN
Acker, F. C., Capt.	USN
Armstrong, W. Park, Jr.	State
Ayer, Frederick	USAF
Baker, James	Harvard
Belmont, A. H.	FBI
Canine, Ralph J., Lt. Gen., USA	NSA
Chandler, Fitzhugh, Col.	USA
Cutler, Robert	NSC
Drain, D. T., Cdr.	USN
Drake, Thomas R., LCDr.	USN
Espe, Carl F., Rear Adm.	USN
Friedman, William F.	NSA
Gibbs, Jack A., Col.	USAF
Godel, William H.	OSD
Gregg, G. W., Col.	USAF
Hamilton, Lyman C.	Budget
Harrold, F. J., Jr., Lt. Col.	USAF
Harvey, Mose	State
Hedden, Stuart	Consultant
Holland, Henry F.	State
Holtwick, J. S., Capt., USN	NSA
Howe, Fisher	State
Hulick, Charles	State
Jernegan, John D.	State
Jones, S. E., Capt.	USN
Jones, J. Wesley	State
Junghans, Earl A., Capt.	USN
Koons, Tilghman B.	NSC
Lay, James S., Jr.	NSC
Lerette, Earl L., Col.	USA
Lindbeck, J. A., Cdr.	USN
Lydman, Jack	State

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McClure, Robert A., Brig. Gen., USA	MAAG
McConaughy, Walter	State
McFarlane, R. N., Capt.	USN
Macy, Robert M.	Budget
Matlack, Mrs. Dorothy	USA
Montgomery, J. H., Jr., Col.	USA
Mooney, J. T., Cdr.	USN
Moore, H. G., Capt.	USN
Murphy, Robert	State
Nash, D., Capt.	USN
Papich, Sam	FBI
Perez, Ramon N., Cdr.	USN
Reeder, H. G., Col.	USAF
Samford, John A., Maj. Gen.	USAF
Scammon, Richard	State
Setchell, J. F., Col.	USAF
Siegmund, T. C., Cdr.	USN
Spore, B. W., Cdr.	USN
Stevens, Leslie C., Vice Adm., USN (Ret)	Consultant
Stuart, C. J., Capt.	USN
Sullivan, J. B., LCdr.	USN
Thurston, Raymond	State
Trudeau, Arthur G., Maj. Gen.	USA
Weinbrenner, G. R., Col.	USAF
Welden, Frank, Cdr.	USN
Wiggin, Bruce E., Capt.	USN
Young, Kenneth T.	State


APPENDICES

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



16 FEB 1959

Please review the bracketed portions.
The remainder of the document was
previously declassified under
NLE RAC review - 8/24/2000
(downgraded to Confidential)
per CIA - 2/23/96

NLE MR Case No. 2001-97

Document No. 1

**MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Secretary
National Security Council**

**SUBJECT : Third Report to the President by the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities, dated October 30, 1958.**

**REFERENCE : Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence,
Same Subject, from Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.,
dated December 29, 1958.**

**APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2002**

1. The subject report as presented to the President on December 16, 1958, contained the following recommendation:

"The present mission of the Plans Group of the CIA be reviewed with consideration given to relieving that Group of, and placing elsewhere in the Agency, the responsibilities (1) for the review of (i. e., reporting on and evaluating) the Political, Psychological and Para-Military operations of the Agency, and (2) for the formulation of the intelligence estimates and recommendations upon which the plans for such operations are based."

2. Reference memorandum stated that the President requested my views and comments before taking action on this recommendation. This memorandum is in response to that request.

3. The text of the report of December 16, 1958, to the President explained some of the reasoning of the Board resulting in this recommendation. This report refers to "some of the virtually autonomous functions assigned to this Group," and states, "From evidence we have seen, it is our feeling that, within this frame of reference, the Plans Group (for the Agency) may be incapable of making objective appraisals of its own intelligence information as well as of its own operations when it is involved in Cold War

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activities which are the subjects of the report. It is recognized that the implications of this not only because of possible impacts on the programs of the Agency but, more importantly, because of the influences which may be brought to bear on foreign policy determinations which, in large measure, may be based upon Agency reporting."

4. The Board of Consultants may feel that there is a greater degree of autonomy or independence possessed by the Deputy Director for Plans (Plans Group) than actually exists. Final responsibility and authority for all activities of the Clandestine Services, just as is true with respect to the activities of other Deputy Directors, rests with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a fact that the DD/P, as well as the other Deputies, may take action on behalf of the Director, but in case of operations of the DD/P under NSC 5412, only after the necessary policy guidance has been obtained from the 5412 Committee.

5. It is particularly important to note that before CIA cold war (5412) activities are initiated all available intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates, prepared on a community-wide basis, is taken into account. Further, while we recognize that in covert operations a major source of information on the accomplishments of the project may be clandestine, we are constantly on the alert to analyze all available information to guard against subjectivity or self-serving reports.

6. To the above comment I would add that we fully concur with the Board's recommendation to review the mission of the DD/P (Plans Group), and that such a review is currently in progress. A new Deputy Director for Plans assumed his position on January 1, 1959. He is undertaking a complete review of the mission and organization of the Clandestine Services. In concert with this the Inspector General of the Agency is reviewing the overall organization of the DD/P.

7. Further, several steps have already been taken in reorganizing the DD/P area. The Inspection and Review Staff will be abolished as of March 1959. The Southeast Europe Division [redacted] will be abolished, with its country desks incorporated into existing area divisions. The Near East Asia Division (Near East and Africa) is being split up to create a new Africa Division and thus place greater emphasis on that vital area. A new division is being created to centralize new projects using aircraft or technical methods for intelligence collection.

8. It is suggested that a full report on the review of the DD/P area be submitted on June 30, 1959.


Allen W. Dulles
Director

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UNITED STATES
 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

UNCLASSIFIED

March 23, 1959

*McCone feels DDE
 and MacMillan are
 receptive to the a
 partial ban on
 atmospheric tests*

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

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My impressions of the meeting at Camp David the afternoon of March 21, 1959, which was attended by Prime Minister Macmillan, Selwyn Lloyd, and several British representatives including Ambassador Harold Caccia, The President, Mr. Herter, Mr. Quarles, Dr. Killian, Mr. Farley, Mr. Robert Murphy, Mr. Merchant, and myself.

Macmillan briefly outlined his discussion with Mr. Khrushchev explaining his suggestion to Mr. Khrushchev of a limited number of on-site inspections. Macmillan explained that Khrushchev had been critical of the West proposal indicating it was a military espionage plan. Macmillan indicated that Khrushchev looked with some favor on the Macmillan suggestion.

Macmillan then raised the question as to whether we should pursue the negotiation for test suspension or abandon it entirely.

Dr. Killian then reviewed the technical aspects reporting the original Geneva findings, the changes resulting from the HARDTACK II shots which necessitated the tabling of revised data in January, and finally the reports of the Berkner Committee and the High Altitude Committee. He summarized these reports accurately and emphasized the dangers of decoupling. He also spoke about the possibilities of high altitude testing, the difficulty of detection even with satellites, and finally spoke of the possibilities of a simplified detection system for atmospheric shots he had read in the Harold Brown to Libby telegram of March 19th.

Macmillan then again posed the question as to whether all of the technical difficulties had not placed us in a position where we must decide whether to pursue the course originally set out last summer with the Geneva technical conference or recognize the technical complexities which had since arisen and for that reason change direction.

The President was emphatic at all times in urging agreements only where adequate safeguards are provided and stating that we could not under any circumstance enter into agreement in which adequate safeguards were not provided. In response to questions, I responded that this was my position and, furthermore, I knew that this would represent the position of authority of committees on health. At one point Macmillan emphasized the importance of an agreement in the interest of discouraging

March 23, 1959

fourth power developments and made something of a plea to reach an agreement even though it might not be fully safeguarded as an essential step in the interest of human welfare.

The Group reviewed the purposes of the original negotiations which were, (a) stop fallout, (b) limit weapons development, and (c) discourage Nth party developments. Some ideas were advanced from our side that we might unilaterally declare stopping of atmospheric tests but would go forward with underground and perhaps high altitude shots. This suggestion was made by the President. It was felt that this would not meet the third criteria, mainly, the discouraging of Nth power development.

The AEC plan of agreeing to stop atmospheric shots and to approach underground shots later was looked on with favor and I think it was generally felt that this is probably the best and most sensible approach to the problem.

DOE ARCHIVE

The British expressed no interest in high altitude shots. Quarles insisted that we had an interest in such shots and was not prepared to relinquish that right. The Prime Minister then dealt with the question of breaking off the negotiation, pointing out that we should break on the question of the veto and should not inject these new technical considerations at this time. All seemed in agreement with this point of view.

The meeting was not conclusive except on this latter point and it was felt that we should have further discussions prior to the resumption of negotiations on April 13th.

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After the meeting I had a private talk with Macmillan who proposed that on April 13th the negotiators prepare an agreed memorandum on the points in which they were in agreement and set forth the points in which they were in disagreement. Then we would develop that the disagreements were beyond the competence of the negotiators and therefore would have to be referred to the Heads of State in their August meeting. Macmillan felt that prior to the August meeting we could have an agreed approach worked out indicating but not stating definitely that it would follow the AEC plan. He felt that Khrushchev would be obliged to accept this and that we could then proceed for two or three years to further develop the underground techniques with no prohibition on testing.

Throughout the discussion I emphasized the importance of underground testing because of its contribution to weapons development and pointed out on several occasions that we could not voluntarily stop underground testing and permit the Russians to proceed with underground testing because of the very important advancements in weapons that they could make during a period even though it was only two or three years. The President supported me in this position.

March 23, 1959

Following the meeting and on the way back Killian attempted to outline his position precisely. It was as follows: First, he would break on the veto; second, he would propose a cessation of atmospheric testing with a simple form of detection, as outlined by Harold Brown; third, he would advocate further work on underground tests as a means of perfecting detection. His views were confirmed by Quarles. It is obvious that both have swung around to the AEC position. In fact, I feel that the AEC's position is now pretty well recognized as the proper one by everyone concerned.

DOE ARCHIVES

It was gratifying to me that throughout the meeting the President made several references to Plowshare and to the wonderful prospects of this project and its necessity of preserving our rights to proceed with this type of experimental development work.

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John A. McCone

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

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Office of the Director



1 Mar. 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Fifth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 11 December 1959. (Recommendation Regarding "National Intelligence Priorities")

1. The subject recommendation reads as follows:

"It is recommended that a realistic appraisal of our priority national intelligence objectives be undertaken on an urgent basis; and that the Intelligence Community's emphasis on collection objectives be re-directed to insure that primary emphasis and support are given by the entire Community to the fulfillment of our most critical national intelligence collection programs, as distinguished from fulfillment of departmental intelligence requirements of lesser importance to the national security."

2. The text preceding this recommendation indicates that the Board of Consultants was particularly concerned with our lack of success, to date, in discovering the operational characteristics and deployment of Soviet ballistic missile units, and that the Board attributes this lack of success to two factors:

a. "a tendency on the part of certain elements of the Community to place undue emphasis on fulfilling departmental rather than national intelligence requirements"; and

b. "the approach presently taken to the matter of establishing and implementing the most meaningful national intelligence priorities."

3. All members of the Intelligence Community are deeply concerned regarding our inability, to date, to identify and describe Soviet operational ballistic missile units. No member of the Intelligence Community would subordinate the solution of this urgent problem to the pursuit of a parochial interest. Insofar as the Priority National Intelligence Objectives are concerned, this subject has been a matter of First Priority since the present PNIO series was instituted in 1954.



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Our partial lack of success, to date, is attributable, not to want of priority in the direction of our effort, but to the inherent difficulties of the problem and to the fact that, due to the risks involved, we have been permitted to use only sparingly the most promising (certainly the most effective) source of hard intelligence on this subject. An intensive research and analysis effort has been undertaken in order to define the limits of the coverage required for this purpose and so to enhance the chances of achieving a breakthrough by this means. We remain hopeful of achieving this at the earliest date which the nature of the problem and of the resources at our disposal will allow. Some progress has been made since the date of the Board's report. We shall exert every effort to improve this situation.

4. The latest revision of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives was adopted as recently as 15 December 1959. It is subject to continuing review.

5. The PNIOs prepared pursuant to NSCID-1 are a statement of the most critical substantive problems currently confronting the Intelligence Community, for the guidance of intelligence research as well as of intelligence collection. These however are of necessity in rather general terms and must be developed by more specific collection guides. The derivation of specific collection requirements from these stated objectives requires analysis by research personnel to determine the elements of information essential to a solution of the problem, the elements already available or readily accessible through research, the additional information obtainable through routine collection, and the additional information of such importance as to warrant a priority collection effort. After such priority collection requirements have been conveyed to collection agencies, there still remain administrative determinations to be made regarding the suitability of a given means of collection to the task and the proper allocation of limited resources.

6. The proper allocation of collection resources to particular tasks is a continuing problem requiring constant review, adjustment, and forward planning. For special reasons, this is especially true of the intelligence collection resources represented by the National Security Agency. A study of the proper allocation of NSA resources in relation to the many requirements levied upon them is now in progress.

7. On the understanding outlined above as regards the continuing review of our National Intelligence Priorities, the particular action being taken as regards priorities for NSA and finally the urgent and coordinated action being taken as regards possible Soviet missile bases as described above, I recommend that the President defer action on the subject recommendation, pending a further report on this subject which we will make to your Board of Consultants at its next meeting.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

CUBA

- I. Enthusiastic initial response of Castro officials to Khrushchev's public support was reflected in speeches at 10 July mass rally, but there was an interesting contrast between "Che" Guevara's and Fidel Castro's speeches that suggests Fidel's possible embarrassment at Soviet embrace of his regime.
- A. Guevara told crowds "Cuba today is a glorious island defended by the rockets of the greatest military power in history... We are practically the arbiters of world peace."
- B. But Fidel, in his sickbed TV talk on the same day, while recognizing Khrushchev's "spontaneous" declaration of support, said: "Cuba does not depend for the defense of its sovereignty and independence on Soviet rockets, but rather on the reason and justice of its cause."
- C. By 13 July, Guevara indicated that he may have had a change of heart when he said in an interview: "Any Soviet attempt to establish a Communist satellite in Cuba would be resisted to the last drop of blood."
- D. Most educated Cubans oppose alignment with Soviet bloc, and though opposition still unorganized and leaderless, US embassy believes implications of Khrushchev's speech should be a powerful influence in developments over next few weeks.
- II. Internally, trends continue toward tighter dictatorship and enhanced Communist influence.
- A. [REDACTED] growing number of arrests of "counterrevolutionaries."
- [REDACTED]

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- [REDACTED]
1. [REDACTED] on 7 July ordered detention 17 officers of Castro's army.
- B. Pro-Castro lawyers, some in militia uniform, seized offices Havana Bar Association and on 8 July named new governing board.
1. The duly elected board is protesting to President Dorticos, who is president of National Bar Association, but probably to no avail.
 2. Ambassador Bonsal comments: "This is another important step in establishing monolithic support of government by professional institutions."
- C. Cuban press announced 6 July that all provincial officers of powerful Communist-controlled Cuban Workers' Confederation have been replaced by men "who truly respond to the revolutionary moment in which the country now lives."
- D. Communist leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is becoming increasingly prominent and we have reports that he may be named minister of finance.
1. He has long been one of Castro's closest advisers, but until recently has remained in background.
- E. Cuban ambassador in Bonn defected 11 July with strong anti-Castro, anti-Communist declaration and announcement he would work to oust Castro.
1. He was sixth ambassador to defect in last 30 days.
- F. US Embassy has growing feeling that Castro may be willing to sacrifice Cuban interests for sake of what appears to be his greater ambition--humiliation of US, wrecking of inter-American system, and eventual "liberation" of all Latin America.

[REDACTED]

G. Castro's illness apparently genuine, but we have only the reports of his doctors to go on. They say he has slight lung infection, which suggests pneumonia or pleurisy, and will be laid up for several weeks. There is nothing to confirm rumors of a mental breakdown.

III. Castro's ministers of economy and commerce reported worried over possible US embargo on foodstuffs, but are confident they can lick oil and sugar problems.

A. Reliable contact of embassy's agricultural attache says these officials feel they would face "dangerous situation" if US cuts off food shipments to Cuba (primarily lard, rice, flour, and corn.) They fear this would be worse than imminent shortage of farm and industrial machinery parts.

B. Current very depressed market for tanker charters eases Soviet effort to supply Cuba with oil.

1. ~~The~~ ^{The} depressed market ^{enables} ~~the~~ Soviet Union ^{to} ~~can~~ deliver oil to Cuba and other distant markets at competitive prices.

2. British, Norwegian governments have already indicated to American embassies their inability to influence tanker owners against accepting Soviet charters or to violate existing arrangements.

IV. In 12 July press conference, Khrushchev ridiculed reports of Soviet interest in military bases in Cuba: "A most silly fabrication. What do we need bases in Cuba for?"

A. Highly doubtful that Soviet Union would carry its commitments to Cuba to extent of establishing base there.

[REDACTED]

V. Among the US acts of "intervention" and "aggression" cited in Cuba's request for UN Security Council action was "the recent meeting of the NSC, at which the future of Cuba was discussed as if that country were a factory or a subject people."

VI. Khrushchev's missile threat and Cuba's call for UN Security Council debate have startled many Latin American governments out of earlier aloofness, and majority favor formal inter-American consideration of problem. (end)

A. OAS Council is to meet Saturday morning to consider Peru's request for meeting of foreign ministers.

1. Meeting would be primarily concerned with Cuban problem.
2. Several high-ranking Argentine foreign ministry officials had favored a similar initiative.
3. Brazilian foreign ministry officials favor a strong stand on Cuba.
4. Chile is now expected to support a call for an OAS meeting on Cuba despite its previous insistence on an informal Latin American effort to conciliate US-Cuban differences.
5. Most smaller Latin American countries have for some time supported view that the Cuban regime is a hemisphere problem.

B. But most Latin Americans fear domestic reaction to pro-Castro groups.

1. Brazilian, Bolivian, Chilean, Peruvian, and Venezuelan officials have expressed concern that pro-Castro strength in their countries will limit their ability to support the US.

- [REDACTED]
- C. Mexico, probably traditionally the most sensitive to any suggestion of foreign interference in internal affairs, has taken equivocal stand.
1. Strongly pro-Cuban leftist minority attacking US policy on Cuba and pressuring Lopez Mateos government to take firmer pro-Cuban stand.
 - a. On 7 July influential leftist ex-president Lazaro Cardenas attacked US "economic aggression" against Cuba, compared Cuban position today to Mexican position after foreign oil interests seized there in 1938.
 - b. Communist leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano reliably reported planning mass rally in Mexico City at unnamed date, ostensibly to support Lopez Mateos, but probably to pressure him into firmer pro-Castro policy.
 - c. Leftists may further seek to exploit innate Mexican resentment of US "interference" in its affairs.
 2. Only clarification of Mexico's official position on Castro regime given in 11 July press release by Foreign Minister Tello.
 - a. Declared recent pro-Cuban statements by Mexican congressmen do "not necessarily" reflect opinions of Lopez Mateos administration.
 - b. Recognized existence in Mexico of "deep affection" for Cuban people.
 - c. Advocated efforts to solve US-Cuban difficulties within framework of OAS.

[REDACTED]

VII. Latin Americans appear surprised at US announcement of new aid plan for hemisphere.

A. Only official comment to date is from Brazil. President Kubitschek in press statements 11 and 12 July seemed annoyed he not consulted, expressed hope that plan, when known, would show US has adopted positive attitude toward his "Operation Pan America."

1. Said "palliatives and emergency measures" will never cure the ills that beset Pan-Americanism.

2. Kubitschek's chief foreign policy advisor quoted privately and in press 11 July as saying "Fidel Castro had to make a pact with Russia before the US would think about OPA."

B. Bolivian leader right-wing government forces commenting on Cuban situation 12 July said privately "unlikely any Latin American country would speak out very strongly against Castro in OAS since all grateful to him for awakening US to Latin American realities."

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MR Case No. 94-388

Document No. 1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

*Rec'd 1/17/61
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By Authority Of CIA 51883
By JIS NLE Date 8/30/94



9 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Sixth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated May 24, 1960 (Recommendation on "Organization and Management of CIA's Clandestine Services")

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, same subject, from Mr. Gordon Gray, dated December 16, 1960

1. In compliance with your request I submit the following self-contained compilation of my previous reports on the various steps which have been taken in response to the two recommendations made by the Board on October 30, 1958 and May 24, 1960. As you requested, the following compilation is so arranged as to identify those actions which were taken or considered in connection with the Third Report of the Board as distinguished from actions which were taken or considered in connection with the Sixth Report of the Board.

2. The Third Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated October 30, 1958 and presented to the President on December 16, 1958 contained the following recommendation:

"The present mission of the Plans Group of the CIA be reviewed with consideration given to relieving that Group

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of, and placing elsewhere in the Agency, the responsibilities (1) for the review of (i. e., reporting on and evaluating) the Political, Psychological and Para-Military operations of the Agency, and (2) for the formulation of the intelligence estimates and recommendations upon which the plans for such operations are based."

3. The text of the report of December 16, 1958 to the President explained some of the reasoning of the Board resulting in this recommendation. This report referred to "some of the virtually autonomous functions assigned to this Group", and states, "From evidence we have seen, it is our feeling that within this frame of reference, the Plans Group (for the Agency) may be incapable of making objective appraisals of its own intelligence information as well as of its own operations when it is involved in Cold War activities which are the subjects of its own reports. We are concerned about the implications of this not only because of possible impacts on the programs of the Agency but, more importantly, because of the influences which may be brought to bear on foreign policy determinations which, in large measure, may be based upon Agency reporting."

4. The Board of Consultants may have felt that there was a greater degree of autonomy or independence possessed by the Deputy Director for Plans (Plans Group) than actually existed. Final responsibility and authority for all activities of the Clandestine Services rest with me as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a fact that the DD/P may take action on behalf of the Director, but in the case of operations under NSC 5412 only after the necessary policy guidance has been obtained from the 5412 Committee.

5. It is particularly important to note that before CIA Cold War (5412) activities are initiated all available intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates, which are produced by the Intelligence Community, is taken into account. Further, while it is true that in covert operations a major source of information on the accomplishments of the project may be clandestine, we analyze all available information from all sources to guard against subjectivity or self-serving reports.

6. The present Deputy Director (Plans) assumed his position on January 1, 1959, shortly after the Third Report was submitted to the President. He at once undertook a complete review of the mission and organization of the Clandestine Services. In concert with this the

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Inspector General of the Agency was engaged in reviewing the overall organization of the Clandestine Services. As a further measure I initiated a Program for Greater Efficiency within the Agency as a whole in order to ensure a continuing effort to improve its organization and methods of operation. This program and other aspects of the Board's Third Report were discussed at the meeting of the Board on July 17, 1959. As a result of these several reviews a number of organizational changes were made and many others were considered but rejected for various valid reasons. The main objective of these changes was to improve the efficiency of the Clandestine Services. A new Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Psychological and Paramilitary Operations was appointed to assist the DD/P in the operational direction of activities in these functional fields. An Operational Services grouping was created, combining and centralizing the direction of several elements which perform functions of common concern to all the Operating Divisions and Staffs. The Inspection and Review Staff, DD/P was abolished and the Inspector General of CIA made solely responsible for the comprehensive review of the activities and operations of the Clandestine Services, reporting directly to me.

7. The planning system within the Clandestine Services was revised so that a greater distinction is made between operational planning directives and budgetary estimates. The revised system calls for an initial DD/P operational plan containing guidance and direction for the operating divisions and staffs for the forthcoming fiscal year. From this the divisions and staffs can prepare their more detailed Operational Programs which go forward for review and approval by the Project Review Committee which reports directly to me. The budget and fiscal requirements are generated as a by-product of these Operational Programs. Finally, Related Mission Directives, also based on the Operational Plan and Programs and the particular situation in the area concerned, set forth more precise and realistic objectives and tasks for each field station.

8. In addition to the above these reviews of the mission and organization of the Clandestine Services highlighted the following aspects of its work which merited further attention and study and on which action has been or is being taken:

- a. the Agency's responsibility for the coordination of U. S. clandestine activities abroad
- b. delegation of more authority to the field

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- c. increased emphasis on scientific and technical collection methods and systems
- d. refinements in what we are reporting and how we are reporting it
- e. greater reliance on over-all country programs in the control and management of our operations as opposed to reliance on individual projects
- f. [REDACTED]
- g. more emphasis on political action in under-developed areas
- h. development of our capability for "covert limited warfare"
- i. increased records mechanization.



1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

In this major effort to improve the organization of the CS but most especially the methods and procedures--the way business is transacted--the DD/P and his Staff have kept in mind the recommendation of the Board quoted above. Several of the changes made are responsive to this recommendation.

9. The second part of the Board's recommendation was concerned with the location of responsibility for the formulation of intelligence estimates and of recommendations upon which plans for operations are based. It suggested that such responsibility not be located in that portion of the Agency which is responsible for planning operations.

10. The problem of insuring the provision of a valid and unbiased intelligence base for operational planning purposes has been given much consideration within CIA during the development of the Clandestine Services planning cycle. The Board's concern, I feel, has been met by the procedures described below.

11. Planning for Psychological, Political and Paramilitary operations is not based on intelligence provided solely by the DD/P. The

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primary source of intelligence for planning purposes is the Office of National Estimates (ONE). Present DD/P procedures provide for the use of ONE guidance throughout the entire planning cycle. The Clandestine Services General Plan, DD/P's basic planning document, derives from current NIE's the contingencies against which clandestine activities must be directed. Moreover, specific projects are tested against pertinent NIE's or, if a current or relevant NIE is not available or time is sufficiently urgent to make a coordinated NIE impossible, an ONE estimate memorandum is obtained.

12. There are further independent checks of PP/PM projects internally within CIA. Such projects are generally reviewed by the Project Review Committee which is presided over by the Director or Deputy Director of CIA and is widely representative of the Agency as a whole, including the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Support, and the Inspector General.

13. Significant PP/PM projects having political import and involving substantial expenditures receive a thorough review and concurrence by the Department of State and by the 5412 group, before final approval by the Director. Such concurrence is sought on the basis of relevant intelligence available to the Agency as a whole. While PP/PM projects may be recommended by the DD/P, action thereon in all significant cases is not possible until internal and external procedures, as described above have been satisfied. Thus action is not taken on intelligence or recommendations from the DD/P alone.

14. The Sixth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated May 24, 1960, included the following comments and recommendation:

"Organization and Management of CIA's Clandestine Services

"Based upon an exchange of correspondence between the National Security Council and this Board in November, 1959, we have continued to follow developments relating to needed improvements in the organization and management of CIA's Clandestine Services. Although a few significant changes have been made in this area in recent months, we believe that a way can be found to organize these Services along more simplified and efficient lines. While we appreciate that the missions assigned to the Clandestine Services are



complex, we are hopeful that, through the continuing studies being made by CIA's Deputy Director/Plans, these Services will be organized in such manner as to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and achieve increased effectiveness."

15. I concurred with these comments of the Board and reaffirmed that the continuing studies being made by the DD/P of the organization of the Clandestine Services and the methods and procedures employed in carrying out the mission of the CS had as principal objectives the elimination of unnecessary duplication and the achievement of increased effectiveness. As noted by the Board and as reported above in this paper significant changes in the organization and management of the CS were made.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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1.5(c)
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Through these organizational changes, revision and simplification of certain basic procedures, and clarification of the functions and responsibilities of both staff and line components we made progress toward our objectives. It is important to realize that this is a continuing process and one which must be carried out on a progressive basis with the least possible disruption of current activities.

16. The CS accomplishes its mission through components responsible for a prescribed geographical area and through other components responsible for a prescribed function without geographical limitations. This approach is required because of the complexity of the tasks and broad interests of the CS. Under these arrangements it is inevitable that some duplication exists but it should not be inferred that all such duplication is unnecessary. We make every effort to reduce duplication to that which is unavoidable if we are to assure that all our responsibilities are discharged in a competent and secure manner.

17. The roles of the Special Staffs recently have been further clarified and delimited with the objective of eliminating duplication and relieving the staffs of the responsibility for any activity which can properly be performed in the operating divisions. I am satisfied that the Special Staffs have unique and important functions of common concern


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and world-wide application that can not be accomplished in the operating divisions. It is of course essential that these functions are carefully identified and that all officers of the CS clearly understand precisely which activities are the responsibility of the Special Staffs. To accomplish this the Deputy Director (Plans) is now revising the functional statements of the Staffs which will concentrate on their four basic functions, viz.:

- a. Services of common concern such as Liaison with other agencies and with other components of CIA, screening of requirements, and certain specialized activities

- b. Support activities including certain forms of research, the promulgation of doctrine, development of new ideas and the provision of expert advice and guidance in the several functional fields.
- c. Developing plans for and assisting in the coordination of functional programs involving activities in two or more geographic areas.
- d. Participating in the evaluation of the production and accomplishment of the CS.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

18. As an additional measure to prevent possible duplication the Deputy Director (Plans) further modified the staff organization in the area divisions to eliminate separate Foreign Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Covert Action sections. These divisions now have centralized operations staffs.

19. 

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20. In order to make the most effective use of our resources in the performance of certain important functions the Deputy Director (Plans) is developing standing operating procedures which will be followed for specific activities. Planning, for example, will be a joint endeavor of the Projects and Programs Group, the Special Staffs, and the Operating Divisions under the general supervision and guidance of the Senior Planning Officer. This planning community will insure that the talents of appropriate officers and the capabilities of all interested components of the CS are brought to bear on specific problems. Similarly, appropriate operating procedures will delineate the capabilities of properly qualified officers and components in the research and evaluation functions. This is an economical way to do the job since it will permit effective planning, research, evaluation, etc. without requiring a number of small units formally established for these functions.

21. The Deputy Director (Plans) believes the changes he has made in the past two years in the organization structure and the way of doing business in the CS have corrected deficiencies and that the situation in this regard is now satisfactory. I concur in this belief. This does not imply that we have achieved such perfection in these important matters that no future modifications will be desirable. We may require further adjustments to meet new situations. We must strive progressively to improve our methods and simplify our structure where feasible. To meet these requirements the Deputy Director (Plans) will continue to study the organization and procedures of the Clandestine Services and take such action as may be required to contribute to our goal of greater efficiency in the Clandestine Services.


Allen W. Dulles
Director

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January 12, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
December 19, 1960

Others present: Secretary Herter, Asst. Secretary Berding,
Asst. Secretary Farley, Secretary Gates, General Lemnitzer,
Secretary Anderson, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. McCone, Dr.
Kistiakowsky, Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Harr,
General Goodpaster



Mr. Herter said the group had come in to talk about the problem raised by information they have received to the effect that the Israelis are operating a plutonium production plant. This information is now beginning to leak to the press. He had a statement which he proposed be made public by the State Department, stressing that the Israelis assert this plant is for peaceful purposes. Mr. Gates said that our information is that the plant is not for peaceful uses. Dr. Kistiakowsky said there is some doubt about this, inasmuch as there seems to be no chemical separation plant on the site, Mr. McCone said that his people believe there is a chemical separation plant there. In any event, the Israelis would not build such a plant just to do part of the job. He stated he thought the plant had probably been financed from U.S. support for Israel.

On this point, Mr. Herter said it is clear that they have constructed this plant through diversions from private and public aid to Israel. Mr. Anderson said that the Israelis are getting an Ex-Im Bank loan, based on proper use of their economic resources.

Mr. McCone said he would like to suggest that the U.S. insist that the Israelis put this plant under the IAEA safeguards. The President commented that we could base such a request on evidence now reported to us that they are building an atomic plant of a value between \$100 and \$200 million dollars. We should add that we do not know where they have obtained the funds, but have a proper interest in this because of the aid we are giving them. Mr. Gates suggested that we say we will expect the Israelis to open this plant to inspection, pointing out that they have adhered to the Vienna agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy. The President thought our statement should be that we are confident, in view of their vote for this convention and their statement that this is for peaceful uses, that they will permit such inspection. Mr. Herter thought they

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might reply that they will do so when the U.S. permits inspection of its plant. The President stated that we do not conceal that our plants are for weapons materiel production, nor do we make any claim that such production is peaceful.

Mr. Dulles said the Israelis seem to be trying to confuse this plant, which is a large production installation, with the very small research reactor on which we are helping them. Mr. Gray advanced the question whether we should tell the Israelis that we want a look at this plant. The President said this would not be necessary if we tell them that we want the IAEA to inspect it as a matter of course. At this point Mr. Herter read aloud his message concerning a meeting he had had with the Israeli Ambassador ten days ago when this matter first came to our attention.

Mr. Gray suggested that, short of the President, the Secretary of State should be the spokesman of our government and give guidance to everyone as to comments on this matter. The President thought we could say that we knew something was being done in this field,



Mr. Gates said the critical question is how deeply the French are in this with the Israelis. The whole matter of atomic development is very explosive with the French, and they will probably react more strongly against us than the Israelis. Mr. Anderson thought that was a further reason for putting the task of inspection on the IAEA.

The President thought it was of great importance that we speak with a single voice insofar as the U.S. government reaction is concerned. Mr. Dulles commented in this regard that the Soviets and the Arabs are going to cause all the trouble they possibly can. Mr. Herter said that is the reason we are sending this note. We at least will remove ourselves from suspicion. The President said there is more of a problem than that involved, in that we are now face to face with the question of what we do as further countries become atomic producers. Mr. Herter thought it may still be possible to head off this production by the Israelis. Both in financing and safeguards, he thought we could go very far in our demands.

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Mr. Anderson recalled in this regard a recent problem with the Jewish charities. They have been sending money out without control over the purposes for which it is expended. For this reason there is a real question as to whether these contributions qualify as tax-deductible. We are looking into this at this very moment. The President thought through all of these means we must take the stand that we believe Israel should forthwith open the plants in order to assure that they conform to peaceful purposes.

Mr. Gray asked whether it would not be appropriate for Mr. Herter to see the Israeli Ambassador before any statement is put out. Mr. Herter thought he could simply say now that he saw the Israeli Ambassador and discussed this ten days ago. The President thought that, in reference to this discussion, we should say that we expressed our concern to him.

Mr. Gray again stressed the importance of maintaining a unified front within the government. The President asked whether he should make the statement since that would establish official policy. Mr. Herter thought it would be best to keep the matter with the Secretary of State for the moment. The President thought it is important to say that as of now we have no official information. We have simply a report made ten days ago, which was the cause of our concern. Mr. Gray thought it should be clearly understood that the State Department is the agency having primary responsibility in this matter. The President agreed, saying that no one else is to make any statement that has not been cleared through the State Department.



After brief further discussion, the meeting ended.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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January 13, 1961

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 474th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, January 12, 1961

Present at the 474th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 2, 4 and 5); and the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency (Item 5). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Foreign Economic Policy; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Amory, CIA; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. SCOPE OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE POLARIS PROGRAM
(Memo for Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Secretary of Defense, same subject, dated January 10, 1961)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

Secretary Gates remarked that this was a controversial subject on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had submitted "split papers". Some time ago a program involving the installation of POLARIS missiles on some six to eight cruisers had been evaluated in the Department of Defense. According to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) studies, from the standpoint of cost, effectiveness and other

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NLE Case 94-346#2

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Recommendation 34 which would require that military agencies intelligence instructions to components of unified commands be transmitted through the JCS. Mr. Dulles said he concurred in this recommendation, subject to the proviso that it did not include NSA communications to the service cryptographic agencies in the field. General Lemnitzer said this recommendation involved a problem because of the vast volume of requirements in the technical intelligence field. The JCS were not organized for transmission of this vast volume of requirements. He felt there must be some middle ground; perhaps broad operational requirements as distinct from technical requirements could be transmitted through the JCS. The President pointed out that the recommendation referred to "instructions". Mr. Dulles suggested that the recommendation be amended to indicate that instructions be transmitted through the JCS or as the JCS may direct. General Lemnitzer and Secretary Gates and the President agreed with Mr. Dulles' suggestion.

Mr. Gray next took up Recommendation 37 which would continue the responsibility of CIA stations abroad to coordinate clandestine activities but would relieve CIA case officers of the authority to veto proposed clandestine operations of another agency. Mr. Dulles said he believed this recommendation unnecessary and distinguished between the final decision to approve and the final decision to veto. He said if a military service wishes to appeal the veto of a CIA case officer, the matter would be decided in Washington by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service. He pointed out also that if a field commander considers an operation essential to the security of his command, he can go ahead with the operation pending Washington's decision regardless of the objection of the CIA case officer in the field. General Lemnitzer said the JCS agreed with this recommendation. Mr. Dulles said he had no further objection to the recommendation.

Mr. Gray then turned to a category of recommendations, two in number, on which there is disagreement but with respect to which the DCI recommends a decision at this time. The first recommendation in this category was No. 16 which called for the issuance of a new NSCID No. 8 establishing a National Photographic Intelligence Center. Mr. Gray pointed out that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI were in disagreement on this recommendation, each feeling that his agency should have responsibility for administering the proposed Center. General Lemnitzer believed the Center should operate under the general direction of the Defense Department because the vast amount of the in-put would be produced by the Military Services. Moreover, the Military Services would

Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-61
(Ann Whitman file)

be required to provide ^{training} for and would be the principal customers of the Center, which would be especially important in time of war. He recognized the need of other agencies for photographic intelligence and such intelligence would be made available. He gave assurance that the Center would not be removed from Washington if it were placed under the Department of Defense. Vast quantities of photographic intelligence were now being acquired. No photographic center was available at the present time and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to avoid duplicate centers. The Chiefs feel that the center could most effectively be operated by the Department of Defense with the participation of CIA. Secretary Gates added that Mr. Dulles had agreed that the Center should be operated by Defense in time of war but he (Mr. Gates) felt the need of continuity in the quick transition from peace to war which might occur in the future. This problem was not one of intelligence interpretation but was one of management. Every user agency could interpret the intelligence. Secretary Gates added that the existing Center would have to be expanded in the near future.

Mr. Dulles said some misinterpretation appeared to exist on this subject. The present photographic Center was a joint enterprise consisting of 140 CIA officials, 100 Army officers, and a small but competent Navy contingent of 10 and 7-15 Air Force officers. The Center had been a joint operation for five years and had handled mostly U-2 photography under the management of CIA. The President asked whether the Defense suggestion was that the Center be under J-2. General Lemnitzer replied, no, under the Department of Defense. Secretary Gates added, directly under the Secretary of Defense just as NSA is. The President thought the three Military Services should ^{not} be separately involved in this Center. Since the basic danger to be detected by the Center is military, he believed it would be satisfactory for the military to give central direction to the operation.

Mr. Dulles said the information obtained through this Center was chiefly military only in the targeting field. Photographic intelligence had tremendous political significance and was a matter of common concern to the Washington agencies. The matter was one which fell within the field CIA was established to coordinate. In its five years of operation the Center had developed a group of career officials who intended to make photographic intelligence their life work. If the Center were placed in the hands of the military, rotation of personnel would be the principle followed, if past practice is any guide. The President felt rotation would be fatal to an operation of this kind. Secretary Gates said that

if the Center were placed under Defense, a career staff would be retained and developed. Mr. Dulles said abandonment of rotation was a new idea for the military. He added that the Center had been operated for five years without a leak. Preliminary analysis of photography is made by the Center and information is then disseminated to user agencies. Some of this information is vital to the Department of State. Mr. Dulles felt it would be very damaging to morale to disrupt this going concern at the present time. The President said he would like to inquire into the time element. While some of the information coming from the Center might be vital to the Department of State, he wondered whether it was not the military rather than the State Department which had an instant need for the information. Mr. Dulles said the information developed by the Center was important to the military but was also important to other agencies such as State because of its effect on policy. The President said the information was important but need not reach State as soon as it reached the military. The information might be needed in a matter of seconds by the military.

Secretary Gates said the Center would be considerably expanded in the future and the operation would be different from the U-2 operation. The President believed that the Center must be operated by an expert career staff. This was a question of management which, perhaps, should be studied before being decided so quickly. If he had to decide at the present time, however, he would say, since the present Center is doing well, let it alone except for its enlargement. He understood that the Department of Defense and the JCS had no complaints about the operation of the Center.

Mr. Stans said one difficulty was that the Air Force was establishing its own Center. Secretary Herter said he understood that the film was processed by the Air Force before it went to the Center. Mr. Dulles said this understanding was erroneous. The film is developed by a private company, which has the greatest competence in this field. This company has been developing this film for five years in the greatest secrecy. The film goes to a special branch of the company and is then flown to Washington. The Air Force gets the film at the same time as the Center.

The President said there should be only one Center and that no Service should establish a separate center. Matters of this kind were placed under CIA by the National Security Act because of their common usefulness. Secretary Gates said Mr. Stans was correct in his statement that the Air Force intended to have its own center. When great masses of photographic data were involved,

there was a question of what should be looked at first and how soon. Mr. Gray said he felt the discussion was getting on to very sensitive grounds. The issue was whether there should be a single center or not. The President said there must be a single photographic center. Since CIA was the principal user and collector, he believed the center should be under CIA management as a principle of organization even though the time element still bothered him.

On being called on by the President, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the existing photographic Center under CIA provided copies of its material without delay to all Services which concentrated on tactical intelligence. The Center does not retain the matter until it makes an exhaustive analysis; it passes it on immediately. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt the existing Center was a revolution in photographic techniques. In a year we would be able to obtain as much information from photographs taken 200 miles above the earth as we were able to get from our best reconnaissance plane in World War II. Operation of the Center required expertise. CIA had taken the lead in managing and developing this Center in the past. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt it would result in delay and loss of progress to disturb the Center at the present time. From the technical point of view, he would much prefer an expansion of the present Center to a transfer of the Center away from CIA management.

Mr. Stans raised the possibility of joint CIA/DOD management. The President said he disliked divided responsibility. He believed Defense had not shown any unhappiness with the existing Center. While he knew how important the time element was, he believed the present Center should be kept under CIA management and expanded. The DOD should state its requirements for photographic intelligence. There should be a single center and no Service should be allowed to set up its own center. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the draft NSCID No. 8 provided that the Director of the Center would be chosen by agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Gray then turned to Recommendation 29 which would provide the DCI with a Coordinating Staff. The sole dissent on this recommendation was that of the Secretary of Defense who feels that the DCI should be separated from the CIA without further delay. Mr. Gray also mentioned the views of the Hull Board on this matter (bottom of Page 3 of the Briefing Note). Secretary Gates said the Defense view mentioned by Mr. Gray was the view of the Defense representative on the Joint Study Group. He (Mr. Gates) did not feel that he should comment on the organization of CIA; accordingly, he would take no strong position on this recommendation. The President believed the